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Abstract/Zusammenfassung/Résumé 
The financial sector is assumed to have a catalyst role for economic development. The provision of 
financial services, such as banking services, can directly contribute to poverty reduction and 
economic growth. It enables people to better manage their risks and facilitates investments. The 
importance of an adequate financial service provision has also been recognised for post-conflict 
peacebuilding and reconstruction. So far, research undertaken in this field has mostly explored the 
role of microfinance institutions in post-conflict peacebuilding and the structural pre-conditions 
necessary for the recovery of a depleted financial sector. Little attention has been paid to the role of 
(local) private commercial banks in peacebuilding – particularly in those countries where the 
financial infrastructure was affected by a conflict but remained functional. This working paper looks 
at options of how the local financial sector may contribute to post-conflict peacebuilding, taking the 
specific example of Nepal. It differentiates between private commercial banks, governmental 
commercial banks and microfinance institutions and explores how these institutions were affected 
by the violent conflict in Nepal, how they responded to challenges, and discusses options as well as 
limitations for financial sector engagement in peacebuidling.  
Il est communément admis que le secteur financier occupe un rôle central dans le développement 
économique. La fourniture de services financiers, comme les services bancaires, peut directement 
contribuer à réduire la pauvreté et à favoriser la croissance économique. Cela permet aux 
populations de mieux gérer les risques et de faciliter l’investissement. L’importance d’un système 
financier adéquat a aussi été reconnue dans le cadre des opérations de consolidation de la paix et de 
reconstruction après les conflits. Jusqu’à maintenant, les recherches conduites sur ce sujet se sont 
surtout concentrées sur le rôle de la microfinance dans les situations de consolidation de la paix et 
sur les conditions nécessaires au développement du secteur financier dans des pays où le secteur 
financier a été réduit presque à néant par un conflit. Peu d’attention a été accordée au rôle des 
banques (locales) commerciales privées dans la consolidation de la paix dans les pays où 
l’infrastructure financière a été affectée par un conflit mais est restée fonctionnelle. Cette recherche 
s’intéresse aux différentes options rencontrées par le secteur financier à propos de son éventuelle 
contribution à la consolidation de la paix, en s’appuyant sur le cas du Népal. Il est fait la différence 
entre les banques commerciales privées, les banques commerciales publiques, et les institutions de 
microfinance; la manière dont ces institutions ont été affectées par le conflit violent au Népal et 
comment les acteurs ont fait face aux différents défis sont des points directement abordés, tout 
comme il est discuté les options qui s’offrent au secteur financier pour la consolidation de la paix et 
les limitations inhérentes à un tel engagement. 
Der Finanzsektor hat eine Katalysatorfunktion für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. Finanzielle 
Infrastruktur kann direkt zu Armutsreduktion und wirtschaftlichem Wachstum beitragen. Sie 
ermöglicht es der Bevölkerung, Risiken besser zu managen und Investitionen zu realisieren. Die 
Bedeutung von finanzieller Infrastruktur ist auch für Wiederaufbau und Friedensförderung erkannt 
worden. Bislang hat sich die Forschung in diesem Gebiet hauptsächlich mit Mikrofinanzinstitutionen 
auseinandergesetzt, sowie mit den notwendigen strukturellen Rahmenbedingungen für den 
Wiederaufbau von zerstörter finanzieller Infrastruktur. Kaum betrachtet wurde hingegen, welche 
Rolle der (lokale) private, kommerzielle Finanzsektor für Wiederaufbau und Friedensförderung 
spielen kann - insbesondere in Ländern, in denen der Finanzsektor zwar von einem gewaltsamen 
Konflikt betroffen, aber noch funktionstüchtig ist. Dieses Working Paper beschäftigt sich mit 
möglichen Beiträgen des lokalen Finanzsektors zum Wiederaufbau in Nepal. In der Studie werden 
private kommerzielle Banken, staatliche kommerzielle Banken und Mikrofinanzinstitutionen 
unterschieden. Es wird dargelegt, wie die verschiedenen Institutionen durch den Konflikt in Nepal 
beeinträchtigt wurden; welche Massnahmen ergriffen wurden, um mit den negativen Effekten des 
Konflikts umzugehen; und was die Möglichkeiten und Grenzen eines Beitrags des Finanzsektors zur 
Friedensförderung sein könnten. 
 
 
Financial Peacebuilding 
4 
Background 
1 Introduction 
This report looks at options of how the local financial sector may contribute to peacebuilding in 
countries coming out of violent conflict, taking the specific example of Nepal. Given the importance 
of a functioning financial infrastructure for economic development, the (possible) role of financial 
actors in peacebuilding has been raised by a number of authors. Yet, a more detailed study on the 
potentials and challenges for (local) financial sector engagement in sustainable peacebuilding has 
not yet been undertaken. 
The discussion on the role of the financial sector in peacebuilding is embedded in broader debates 
on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and financial sector entanglement in violent conflicts. 
Awareness and knowledge has successively increased over the last years on how financial actors are 
linked to environmental issues, human rights concerns as well as the emergence or facilitation of 
conflicts. The international financial system has been found to transfer funds to and from a number 
of violent hotspots in the world, fuelling the continuation of civil wars (Winer 2002). Although the 
sector is becoming more and more responsive to the increasing CSR trend, the specific potentials of 
financial institutions in assisting in peace processes are still a relatively niche topic. The UNEP 
Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) report on the role of the financial sector in contributing and easing 
violent conflicts concluded that financial institutions have to be integrated into efforts to prevent 
conflicts and support post-conflict reconstruction. However, the report also acknowledged that “the 
international community has often called for engagement with the private sector in conflict 
prevention and post-conflict reconstruction, yet currently lacks the appropriate framework for doing 
so in the case of the financial sector. Very little useful information has emerged to guide financial 
firms towards engagement in post-conflict reconstruction, and towards encouraging better 
management - if not prevention - of conflict issues by those in whom they invest. Moreover, firms 
are without guidance on appropriate behaviour in instances where the context, in which their 
investment has taken place, changes from peace to conflict or oppression” (Bray et al. 2004: 2). 
It is for this reason that this study aims to add to a better understanding on how the financial sector 
may contribute to effective conflict management. Far from offering an “appropriate framework”, as 
was requested in the UNEP FI report, this study seeks to discuss, using a concrete case, the options 
as well as limitations for financial sector engagement in peacebuidling. It explores how the financial 
sector in Nepal was affected by the violent conflict between the Maoists and the government (1996-
2006), how it responded to challenges and how the sector may contribute to peacebuilding. 
The report looks specifically at local financial institutions. Research on post-conflict financial sector 
development so far has mostly focused on international financial sector actors, microfinance 
institutions, informal institutions such as the hawala system, and formal prerequisites, which are 
considered necessary for the reconstruction of a financial system. Little attention has been paid to 
local formal financial actors. The study looks specifically at private commercial banks but also 
addresses, in order to get a more comprehensive picture, state commercial banks and microfinance 
institutions and their relevance for post-conflict peacebuilding in Nepal. Local private commercial 
banks are understood as banks, which are 100 per cent in Nepalese ownership as well as joint-
venture banks, which are partly held by Nepalis and partly by foreigners. The main reason for also 
including joint-venture banks into the research is their importance for Nepal where 100 per cent 
foreign ownership of banks is not permitted. 
The motivation for choosing Nepal as the case study for this topic was two-fold: Firstly, because at 
the time when the research began, Nepal was at an early phase of its peace-process, allowing 
focusing on the period where local financial institutions may have a particular role to play (see 
below). Secondly, it was known from the literature review that the Nepalese violent conflict
 Introduction 
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negatively affected parts of the financial sector in the country, but did not lead to a full collapse of 
the financial infrastructure. A still partly functioning financial sector was a precondition to explore 
the main research question of this report: the local financial sector’s role in peacebuilding. 
Qualitative methods were chosen for the research. The report is based on about 40 semi-structured 
interviews, most of them conducted in Nepal and some background interviews held in Switzerland. 
In Nepal, 32 interviews were held in Kathmandu and five in a district capital in the South of the 
country. The following groups of interviewees were consulted during the research in Nepal: National 
and international NGO representatives and researchers (8); representatives from the finance sector 
and other business representatives (19); governmental representatives (2); and representatives from 
international organisations (8). The research further benefited from a series of workshops that 
swisspeace realized in 2005 on financial sector contributions to transforming economies of violence. 
The study is structured into two main parts: Part one discusses the general literature on the subject, 
positioning the main research question within the overall debate on corporate engagement in 
conflict management and the debate on financial institutions and CSR (chapter 2). The second part 
of the study deals with the Nepal case study. Chapters three and four provide information on Nepal, 
its economic structure, financial sector landscape and conflict. Chapter five discusses the economic 
impacts of the conflict on the national economy in general and the financial sector in particular. 
Chapters six and seven bring the previously provided information together by analysing and 
discussing the potential and limits of financial sector contribution to peacebuilding in Nepal. The 
quick reader with a background in corporate engagement in peace promotion and / or Nepal may 
want to focus exclusively on chapters six and seven. 
Financial Peacebuilding 
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2 The financial sector in peacebuilding 
The main purpose of this chapter is to set the stage for the case study on Nepal, dealt with in the 
second part of this report. The following paragraphs provide background information on the issue of 
financial actors in peacebuilding; discuss the focus of the study on the local banking sector and 
contextualise the subject in the broader debates on corporate engagement in conflict and conflict 
management.1 
2.1 The financial sector in zones of violent conflicts 
Operating in a conflict context has typically two sides for a company: One is how the company is 
affected by the violence; the other one is how the company itself may contribute to facilitating or 
enhancing the violence. The financial sector has mostly been in the news in the last years with 
regard to the latter. It is primarily through money transfers, provision of deposit services, and 
commercial borrowing to conflict parties that financial institutions knowingly or unknowingly 
facilitate sustained violence (Duffield 2000; Addison 2002; Winer 2002; Mansley 2005). To illustrate 
the links between the international financial system and conflict funding, Taylor wrote in an 
abridged way: “The lifeblood of some armed conflicts is the revenue generated by natural resources 
or illicit trade. Illicit financial services are the arteries that transmit and deploy those revenues. Put in 
the simplest of terms, illicit finance is what makes it possible for money from the sale of conflict 
goods to buy small arms to be used in war” (Taylor 2002: 5). Financial resources are vital for 
conflicting parties - government forces as well as rebel groups - to enter and stay in war. In some 
conflicts, remittances transferred by diaspora groups have helped to fund war. In others, it is the 
selling of natural resources by rebels or state officials that financed warfare. In either case, funds are 
moved through the international finance system - through legal or illegal ways - from abroad into 
the conflict country and from the conflict country to accounts abroad. A number of protracted 
conflicts worldwide, such as in Afghanistan, Angola, Colombia, Liberia or Sierra Leone have in this 
way been associated to the international finance system. 
But although a range of financial regulatory regimes have emerged in the last years addressing 
transactions of proceeds stemming from illegal businesses, none of these regimes directly tackles 
transactions of profits made through the trade of “conflict commodities”, such as diamonds, oil, 
timber or coltan (Winer 2005) (Winer 2002; Winer 2005). The Financial Action Task Force on Money 
Laundering (FATF), for instance, was established in 1989 with the original motivation to contribute 
in the fight against drugs and organised crime. Although the scope of FATF’s work was successively 
revised, FTAF does not address commodities often used to fund war (Kremer 2004). Also other 
initiatives, such as the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, the six UN Principles 
for Responsible Investment, or initiatives by the financial sector itself, including the transparency 
 
______________________ 
1   The term “financial sector” can be understood in many different ways given the highly diverse nature of this sector. For 
some, the term may include commercial banks, insurance or asset managers; others may also include microfinance 
institutions and development banks and again others may argue that the term should also comprise central banks and 
financial regulatory bodies. For the purpose of this study, the term “financial sector” will be used broadly, including 
private and governmental financial institutions, such as banks, insurance development-banks, microfinance institutions 
etc. Financial institutions are understood as agents that provide different financial services for their clients and members. 
Banks are understood here as financial institutions that act as a payment agent for customers, and borrow and lend 
money. The terms private banks and governmental banks are here used to differentiate between the ownerhsip of the 
banks. “Private banks” are not understood as banks that manage the assets of wealthy individuals, but as banks in 
private ownership. Also the term “commercial bank” is here understood in order to differentiate it from development 
banks that provide financial services and credit to underserved markets and populations. Commerical banks are not 
understood as a bank that only deals with deposits and loans from corporations or large businesses. 
The financial sector in peacebuilding 
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standards developed by the Wolfsberg Group tackle money laundering, terrorist financing, 
transparency or corruption through “due diligence” and “know-your-customer” policies, but not 
specific problems related to the financing of conflicts.2 
This is also to some extent true for the frequently cited Equator Principles. The Equator Principles 
(EP) were established in 2003 by a group of international private sector banks as a non-binding set 
of guidelines, seeking to improve the social and environmental performance of project-funded 
transaction.3 The signatories are supposed to only provide loans to projects that can prove sound 
social and environmental construction and operation practices.4 The principles attracted much 
attention from activists and scholars in the field of peace and security studies, given the frequent 
association of project-funded investments with violent conflicts. Project funding is commonly used 
for large infrastructure projects as well as mines, pipelines, or dams, often in developing countries or 
emerging markets where political perils are high. Due to factors, such as the large size of the 
investments, their social and environmental intrusion on local communities, or the related large 
inflow of revenues on the national level, these projects are prone to ignite or contribute to conflicts. 
By providing money to these investments, financial institutions may indirectly trigger or exacerbate 
violence. Many of the aspects covered by the EPs (such as environmental issues) are of importance 
also from a conflict-perspective, but explicit references to conflict contexts are mostly absent in the 
principles. Only in the “illustrative list of potential social and environmental issues to be addressed 
in the social and environmental assessment documentation” are the “protection of human rights 
and community health, safety and security” mentioned, with references primarily made to the hiring 
of security personnel. Although, the Equator Principles improved financial institutions’ social and 
environmental standards (for instance Banktrack 2003; Banktrack 2006; EIRIS 2006), the sparse 
mentioning of conflict issues, is a major shortcoming. This highlights the weaknesses of financial 
sector responses to the issue of violent conflict for one specific funding instrument (Crossin/Banfield 
2006). 
In fact, in comparison to many other economic sectors, the financial sector is relatively late in 
responding to the corporate social responsibility (CSR) trend in general. According to some NGO-
reports, banks still “lag significantly behind relevant international standards and best practices”, 
revealing the challenges that still lay ahead (see for instance The Corporate Responsibility Coalition 
2005; WWF/Banktrack 2005). The rising awareness in the aftermath of 9/11 on the role of financial 
institutions in facilitating the funding of terrorist attacks seemed to have triggered a startling 
momentum. Pressure from regulators tightened, demanding a more careful monitoring of financial 
transactions; voluntary initiatives on transparency and corporate accountability surfaced; social and 
environmental management systems developed; a plethora of publications, workshops and 
conferences realized. The Financial Times wrote, for instance, that between 2004 and 2007, the 
spending of banks in anti-money laundering activities increased by over 50 per cent (Croft 2007), but 
more has still to be done that goes beyond due-diligence and Know-Your-Customer policies to 
adequately address corporate entanglement in violent conflicts. 
 
 
______________________ 
2   Interesting in this context is also the Abacha Commission, where in collaboration with banks some first steps were made 
to repatriate funds stolen by potentates (see for instance Daniel 2004; Scher 2005). 
3   Project finance is a specific funding instrument in which lenders are repaid through the revenues that are generated by the 
project, once in operation (Crossin/Banfield 2006). 
4   The EPs are based on the Safeguard Policies for environmental and social impact assessments by the International Finance 
Cooperation (IFC). In 2006, the EPs were revised in order to respond to the review of IFC’s Safeguard Policies and their 
replacement by the new IFC Performance Standards (Watchman et al. 2007). As of January 2008, 59 financial institutions 
signed the Equator Principles, among them the biggest players in project funding worldwide, primarily, though not 
exclusively anymore from Western countries. 
Financial Peacebuilding 
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Financial institutions’ seemingly limited awareness of their involvement in conflicts is noteworthy 
also given the heavy costs that violent strife can inflict on them. One would assume that this would 
be an incentive for (at least some) financial institutions to try to avoid contributing directly or 
indirectly to violence. This perceived indifference may partly result from the fact that some financial 
institutions may be complicit in violent conflicts without being directly located in conflict countries 
and without having their interests directly threatened by the conflict. In other cases, however, 
conflicts may impact financial institutions with or without any involvement of the banking sector in 
the emergence of violence. 
The conflict risks for the financial sector can assume various forms and may differ significantly 
depending on the characteristics of the financial institution, the course and origin of the conflict or 
the governmental policies applied during the time of the insurrection (see Box 1 for a list of common 
conflict consequences). 
Box 1: Typical direct and indirect effects of violent conflicts on the financial sector 
• loss of personnel due to death or flight; 
• loss of capital, e.g. due to looting; 
• destruction of premises and records due to pillaging, forcing some of financial institutions 
to close down branches or reducing the range of products and services they provide; 
• increased security spending; 
• increased lending risks; 
• downturn in the overall business activities as a consequence of a national economic 
decline, reflected in reduced investment activities, income etc. Changes in the economic 
environment typically have a significant effect on banks. Loans, for instance, are bank’s 
most important product and when loan quality declines, banks can get seriously 
distressed; 
• destruction of loan collaterals and increased uncertainty about the ownership of 
collateral; 
• increase in bad or nonperforming loans and distressed borrowers “through the loss of 
markets together with the destruction of equipment” (Addison et al. 2001a: 5); 
• changed customers’ preferences, with typically an increased preference for foreign 
currency (in contrast to domestic currency) and for movable and real assets (e.g. not 
deposit accounts) (see for instance Addison et al. 2005); 
• capital flight, which is typically hard to “repatriate”; 
• loss of trust; 
• an insecure legal and governmental environment, which makes the enforcement of 
contracts and the pursuit of loan defaulters more difficult for banks; 
• adverse effects because the central bank of a country is not able to adequately fulfil its 
functions (e.g. supervision to ensure banks’ compliance with banking policies and 
legislations; bank registration and licensing); 
• increasing cronyism in the banking sector; 
• spread of informal banking practices (such as the hawala system in Afghanistan) and 
microfinance. 
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Consequences for the financial sector in a country can include a complete breakdown of the financial 
system; the partial and temporary interruption of the central bank with related far-reaching effects 
on the supervision of the banking sector and on monetary policies; or it can include the destruction 
of banking infrastructure in specific areas of a country or countrywide (Addison 2002). Financial 
institutions may in some cases even be direct targets of insurgencies, due to ideological reasons or 
because rebels loot branches in order to fund their fight. Addision et. al., for instance, state: 
“Different types of conflict have different effects on the financial system, and country 
reconstruction-programmes will reflect this. These effects include: guerrilla insurrections that 
disrupt the rural financial system but not the system as a whole (e.g. Guatemala), cronyism 
in bank lending linked to autocratic rule (e.g. the Yugoslav Federation and Zimbabwe); 
temporary shutdown of the financial system due to military revolts (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire and 
Guinea-Bissau) and secessions (East Timor and Kosovo); looting of banks to finance and 
profit from genocide (e.g. Rwanda); civil war that leave central banks intact but otherwise 
damage financial infrastructure (e.g. Somalia 1992-94); and inter-state conflicts in which 
formal financial institutions are stressed but continue to function (e.g. 1998-2000 
Eritrea/Ethiopia war).” (Addison et al. 2001a: 11) 
Most of the consequences of an armed conflict will not only be felt during the conflict period but the 
repercussions will linger and hamper the financial sector also after a conflict has been formally 
ended. It takes, for instance, time until a central bank is fully operational again or until clients have 
regained trust in the national economy and the functioning of its institutions. In fact, the 
reconstruction of a financial sector in a country is not a stand-alone activity but is deeply 
interconnected with reforms and recovery activities on numerous levels. Overall economic 
recuperation, currency reforms, or the revision of the banking legislation have to go hand in hand 
with post conflict financial sector recovery. 
Despite the mostly negative effects of a violent conflict on financial institutions, conflicts may also 
bring about consequences, which - managed in an appropriate way - can turn out to be beneficial. 
Mansley points out that banking activities such as: 
“[…] short-term lending may continue even in conflict zones, if suitable loan security is 
available. Other transactions, such as foreign exchange, money transfer, and deposit-taking 
activities, involve lower risk for the banks and can be particularly lucrative activities, 
particularly if conflict conditions have reduced competition and increased profitability” 
(Mansley 2005). 
In fact, economic activities typically continue to some extent and in some form also during a violent 
conflict. Most commonly, financial institutions may increase security measures, reduce the funds 
held liquid in their branches and change their portfolio of products and services in order to mitigate 
the adverse affects of violent conflicts. From some cases it is known that corporations can show 
remarkable creativity in developing coping strategies. Outstanding is, for example, the Somali 
business sector. Not only did the Somali Shilling continue to exist for years without a central bank in 
place but international money transfers and other bank services (travellers cheques, small consumer 
loans etc.) could be conducted through the traditional hawala system, which is common in many 
Muslim countries. Also in other economic sectors, such as in the construction sector or 
telecommunications, businesses continued to thrive and companies were able to partially replace 
governmental services and infrastructure provision. Somalia’s experience may suggest that it is 
“easier than commonly thought for basic systems of finance and some infrastructure services to 
function where government is extremely weak or absent” (Nenova/Harford 2004). Market failures 
and other shortcomings have, however, become ever clearer the longer the governmental 
regulations were absent. For the financial system, this implied, for instance, a lack of business loans, 
since loan-giving is commonly not practiced through the hawala system (Nenova 2004). 
Financial Peacebuilding 
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In the context of “conflict-resilience”, the microfinance sector is particularly interesting to look at. 
Overall, microfinance in unstable settings and its potentials for post-conflict reconstruction 
attracted broad interest from practitioners and academics. Less is, however, known on the impacts 
of armed conflict on this specific part of the financial infrastructure. Economic downturn, security 
issues or loss of trust may effect microfinance institutions in a similar way as other financial 
institutions. However, for the microfinance sector, it is widely believed that under certain minimum 
criteria (e.g. minimum of stability, stable population, sufficient economic activity), their operations 
can continue or new operations may even be launched despite the conflictive environment. In fact, 
political stability and formal regulatory and enforcement institutions seem to be less important for 
microfinance institutions than originally thought. Formal regulations are typically less important for 
microfinance than for formal financial institutions, making microfinance possibly better suited for 
politically volatile environments. Products will have to be adapted to the changing needs of clients 
(less loans, safer deposit facilities); management practices may have to be revised and profitability 
expectations may have to be scaled down, but microfinance institutions can still operate, illustrating 
also the continued need for financial services in conflict environments (Bruett 2004; CGAP direct 
2004). 
2.2 Potentials and challenges for the financial sector in 
peacebuilding 
Generally, the private business sector’s role in violent conflict is typically seen to have two 
dimensions: Firstly, a conflict-enabling and exacerbating role, as discussed above for the financial 
sector (e.g. Global Witness 1999; Swanson 2002). And secondly, a supportive role in conflict 
prevention and peacebuilding (e.g. UN Wire 5 June 2000; Nelson et al. 2000). Companies can try to 
prevent complicity in violent conflicts, such as by applying conflict-sensitive business practices (for 
example International Alert 2005) and firms can actively engage in conflict management and 
peacebuilding out of self-interest or philanthropic reasons. Particularly the private sector’s 
importance in economic development, poverty alleviation, tax revenue and employment generation 
is frequently alluded to (for instance Bray 2006; Mierke 2006; Mills/Fan 2006).5 Other forms of how 
private sector actors can engage in peacebuilding include support to diplomatic missions, 
awareness-raising or political lobbying for peace (e.g. Nelson et al. 2000; Haufler 2001). 
The private sector’s potential in peacebuilding has so far, however, not been fully understood or 
harnessed. In its analysis of public-private partnerships, the GTZ, for example, concludes that “Public 
private partnerships (PPP) are so far only rarely utilised to address conflict prevention and peace 
building and the potential of this instrument has not been fully utilised in the area of conflict 
prevention and peace building” (Mierke 2006). Concrete and workable ideas for constructive 
contributions to conflict management seem significantly less well developed than those ideas aiming 
to avoid negative effects of corporate activities. Although it is frequently, and probably correctly 
claimed that private companies are self-interested in peace, given that violent conflicts are overall 
economically detrimental to business operations, this does not seem to be sufficient to motivate 
 
______________________ 
5   Given the inter-linkages between poverty and the emergence or recurrence of violent conflicts, poverty eradication and 
development - supported by the private sector - can be important for conflict-prevention and peacebuilding. Scholarly 
research has demonstrated that low income per capita is associated with a higher risk of violent conflict (for a review see 
for instance Humphreys 2003; Rice et al. 2006). However, despite the little disputed correlation between conflict and 
poverty, no clear relation between inequality and the emergence of insurrections could be persuasively proven so far 
(Cramer 2005). The concept of horizontal inequality (inequality between social groups, such as ethnic groups) has strongly 
advanced the understanding of how an unequal distribution of wealth and resources can fuel violent social tensions 
(Stewart 2004) but more research still has to be done. If a country manages to come out of conflict, with its economic and 
social infrastructure typically depleted, the persistent or even enhanced poverty levels are a severe risk factor for conflicts 
to flare up again, snaring a country in the so-called “conflict-trap” (Collier et al. 2003). 
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companies to actively support conflict management. Corporations may often not be aware about 
their potential contributions and they may see conflict management as a purely political matter 
(Collaborative Learning Projects 2003a). 
Yet, there are certainly inspiring examples from many conflict-ridden countries, where companies, 
particularly local ones have actively contributed to conflict management and peacebuilding (for 
examples see Banfield et al. 2006). Overall, local businesses are considered to be important players 
for peace, since they are assumed to be more likely to get engaged in conflict management than 
foreign companies (Champain 2002). Local companies are assumed to be more vulnerable to 
violent conflicts than international firms, since they do not have the same level of flexibility to 
disinvest and move their business operations to other places. In addition, domestic firms are 
commonly more familiar with the territory as well as more bound to the place, making them more 
likely to stay invested or resume business operations early after the cessation of violence. 
Looking specifically at the finance sector, few concrete examples of (local) private finance sector 
engagement in conflict management and peacebuilding seem to exist. Less vague are, however, the 
reasons given why the commercial finance sector’s contribution is considered valuable for 
peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts. One of the main rationales behind the idea of integrating 
the financial sector into peacebuilding is the general importance of a functioning financial service 
sector for economic development and poverty reduction. Economic development is considered a vital 
factor in reconstruction processes, when infrastructure is destroyed, growth rates are depleted and 
the need for a tangible peace dividend is high. When poverty or horizontal inequality belong to the 
conflict causes and when war economies emerge, economic development also helps to tackle the 
roots of the conflict and to offer alternative livelihoods. Providing financial products, such as 
banking services, directly contributes to poverty reduction and economic development. It enables 
people to better manage their risks,6 cope with shocks, such as healthcare emergencies and market 
disturbances, is important to facilitate commerce, mobilise savings, enable investments in education 
or new machinery. In a situation where financial infrastructure is impacted severely by a violent 
conflict, access to investment and working capital is restricted and essential banking services are 
limited, impairing the overall attractiveness of a country for private sector investments (Mills/Fan 
2006). Without a banking system in place companies, for instance, have to use cash payments. In 
situations of low physical security, however, transporting and storing large amounts of money is 
risky and hardly an option for business transactions. Moreover, if firms do not have access to credit 
on the formal market, they may have to fall back on informal financial institutions which tend to be 
more expensive and less reliable. An inadequate access to financial services confines, in other words, 
the ability of private companies to create wealth, income and jobs, which is essential in post-conflict 
contexts to re-integrate former combatants, provide livelihoods for returning internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) and a positive outlook for future developments (see also Addison et al. 2001b: 7; Bray 
2005; Maimbo et al. 2006). 
The research that has been undertaken on the financial sector in post-conflict reconstruction so far 
focused largely on international banks, the regulatory requirements for finical sector development, or 
on the role of the microfinance sector. Little is know about formal local banks and their role in 
peacebuilding. Addison, for instance, published widely on the reconstruction of the financial system 
in terms of currency reforms, central-bank reconstruction, regulatory reforms and the recapitalization 
of commercial banks. He discussed for cases such as Mozambique, Ethiopia/Eritrea and Rwanda, 
how violent conflicts affected the financial systems in these countries and which strategies were 
applied by national and international governmental actors to set in place the necessary prerequisites 
for a banking system to (re-)develop (Addison/Geda 2001; Addison et al. 2001a; Addison 2002; 
 
______________________ 
6  The positive effect of financial development has been studied extensively, among others by T. Beck; Levine, R.; Loayza, N.: 
(2000): “Finance and the Sources of Growth.” Journal of Financial Economics (58), 137-181. 
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Addison et al. 2005). Bray looked more at private sector actors and their role in post-conflict 
reconstruction, while particularly focusing on international companies. He found that for the 
commercial banking sector some specialized international banks, such as Standard Chartered tend to 
go to emerging markets as part of their overall business strategy (for example to Afghanistan, Ivory 
Coast, or Nepal). Other banks invest in post-conflict societies in the context of their regional 
expansion strategies, such as in the case of Austrian banks investing in Bosnia-Herzegovina or a 
Pakistani Bank getting active in Afghanistan (Bray 2005; Bray 2006). But he concluded that 
“International commercial banks tend to come later, but provide a further ‘building block’, 
facilitating the work of aid agencies, foreign investors and - in due course - domestic companies” 
(Bray 2005: 2). Also the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) underscored the 
relevance of private sector help in rebuilding conflict-affected countries, but looks primarily at 
foreign direct investments. In Afghanistan or Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, an investment 
guarantee facility was set up to “facilitate the development of the local private sector”, including 
the financial infrastructure (see www.miga.org). 
Overall, (foreign) financial sector actors are found to be a risk-averse branch. A stable political 
environment, decent level of security and a well-established legal framework are considered 
essential pre-conditions that have to be fulfilled before new banking investments are considered 
(see, however, also the paragraphs dealing with microfinance institutions). In post-conflict settings, 
the investment climate for banks is typically bad, easily eschewing banks from realizing investments. 
If a bad risk scenario is accompanied by small markets, the appeal of the place is low for an 
international bank. While some conflict-prone countries, such as Angola, Iraq or Nigeria may appeal 
to banks because they promise profitable long-term prospects, many others emerging from violent 
conflict such as Cambodia, Guatemala or Nepal have a low market-attractiveness for international 
banking investments (Bray 2005). In fact, many of the weaknesses that commonly deter banks from 
investing in developing countries (e.g. lacking regulation, small markets), are aggravated in conflict-
affect countries. Weak banking legislations, a lack of central-bank supervision and regulation, 
inadequate law-enforcement as well as insufficient skills often go along with debilitated social trust, 
little or no documentation, absence of physical collateral, inadequate infrastructure, and a higher 
risk of non-performing loans (Addison 2002). 
Other foci in the current research landscape on the role of the financial sector in post-conflict 
settings are microfinance institutions (MFIs), as mentioned in the previous chapter, as well as the 
role of remittances. The potential of MFIs has been explored from various angles, in particular its 
role in reconstruction has been emphasised (see for instance Bruett 2004; CGAP direct 2004; 
Nagarajan/McNulty 2004). Similarly, some authors highlighted the importance of remittance-
transfers, arguing that remittances can be a “nucleus” for rebuilding a financial system. Munzele 
Maimbo states, for example: “In recent times, Somalia and Afghanistan typify the ultimate example 
of the financial sector’s ability to use the remittance business as the nucleus of financial sector 
activities during the period of conflict as a life-line to a people afflicted by sustained conflict, and as 
a basis for rebuilding a new financial system on cessation of active conflict” (Maimbo 2007: 26). 
Given the fact that formal international financial sector actors typically come relatively late after the 
end of a violent conflict, examining the potential of informal financial service providers for peace 
seems very relevant - specifically for the earlier stages of a reconstruction and peacebuilding period. 
For water providers it is, for instance, known that small local, often unregulated service-suppliers are 
typically the first to offer services in post-conflict settings, at a time when international companies 
are not yet willing to enter the still volatile country (Schwartz et al. 2004). Similar things are known 
from financial services. In Afghanistan, for instance, businesses and NGOs have used the local 
hawala services, which provid currency exchanges, deposit services and money transfers, due to 
inadequate formal banking services. Although the informal service provision may be insufficient in 
the long-run and of sub-optimal quality, at a time when other players are not yet able to supply 
services, this is better than nothing (Center for Advanced Defense Studies 2006; Maimbo 2007). 
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So far, the research hardly looks at the potential role of local commercial financial actors. In fact, 
many case studies addressing the subject of financial sector development in post-conflict settings 
have been realized in countries where the formal financial sector was nearly fully depleted, such as 
Somalia or Afghanistan. But many countries coming out of war still have some kind of formal 
financial services, such as Guatemala, Sri Lanka, or Nepal. These countries provide a different 
scenario, where the existing formal structures can possibly be drawn on. 
Areas of activity for financial institutions in peacebuilding 
It is noted several times throughout the report that “very little useful information has emerged to 
guide financial firms towards engagement in post-conflict reconstruction” (Switzer/Hussels 2004: 9). 
The focus of the following paragraphs is to present and further develop ideas for local financial 
sector contributions to peacebuilding as well as to discuss their limitations. It is differentiated 
between three areas of engagement: activities that fall into the core-business activities of financial 
actors, conflict-sensitivity related activities, and activities in the field of social investment. 
In principle, what a financial actor is able to do, what it is willing to do and what is appropriate to 
do depend on a broad range of factors. Essential is how the financial sector was affected by the 
conflict, what the (most pressing) needs are with regard to the reconstruction and peacebuilding 
process, and if (and when) there is room for engagement for financial actors. Separatist conflicts, for 
instance, that result in new states (e.g. in ex-Yugoslavia) or conflicts where the financial sector was 
an explicit target of the insurgency have very different starting positions for financial actors than 
low-intensity conflicts. While in the first setting a new currency, central bank regulations etc. have to 
be installed before private-sector engagement can flourish, banks in low-intensity conflict settings 
may more easily get active. Moreover, a financial actor that was severely affected by a conflict may 
struggle to devote the necessary resources. On the other hand, however, it also has to be considered 
that if the financial sector may not have felt the negative consequences of a conflict, the economic 
self-interest to motivate a financial actor to support peacebuilding, may be low. 
I. Core business activities 
Offer new products, developed according to the specific post-conflict needs. 
1. With regard to offering new products that are specifically developed to address post-
conflict needs, UNEP FI suggested setting up “Professionally managed investment funds for 
diaspora communities seeking to contribute to post-conflict reconstruction”, in order to 
better harness the inflow of remittances (Switzer/Hussels 2004: 27).7 The establishment of 
efficient and client-oriented services to transfer remittances could be a vital 
contribution to reduce poverty and facilitate investments in countries coming out of war. 
Developing effective ways to utilize remittances is, however, challenging. Already in 
peaceful environments, the transfer of funds by migrants to their countries of origin can be 
tricky. In situations of violent conflicts or in immediate post-conflict settings, it can be even 
more difficult, partly because remittance transfers during conflict situations have been 
discredited by examples of these funds supporting insurgencies (Weiss Fagen/Bump 2006). 
Such cases of misuse have led to governments increase efforts to regulate the flow of 
remittances, particularly of funds that are channelled through informal mechanisms, such
 
______________________ 
7   More often than not, countries beset by conflict have a considerable diaspora community, since violence forces people to 
leave their home-country, often in a large scale. Money transferred by migrants to their countries of origin are a vital 
source of funding for those that are not able or not willing to leave and can play an important role for economic 
reconstruction and revitalization. In fact, “research shows that migrants transfer funds and invest in their countries of 
origin at times when international investment has all but disappeared” (Weiss Fagen/Bump 2006: i). 
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as the hawala system. The regulations make the system less prone to abuse while, 
however, restricting at the same time modes to transfer money for migrants. 
2. The design of specific ”reconstruction loans”, characterized by longer repayment periods 
and fair interest rates, particularly for small and medium companies could be another type 
of product to be developed in post-conflict contexts. Private companies are typically 
compromised by violent conflicts and may not be able to meet standardized loan 
requirements. Instead of having to go to informal credit sources or not be able to invest at 
all, banks may be able to provide softer loans to companies. Banks may therewith directly 
help to stimulate investment, economic growth and employment generation. 
3. As mentioned earlier, microfinance institutions are considered to be - under certain 
preconditions - a good tool to invigorate economic activities in countries coming out of 
war. Fostering of microfinance institutions could be directed at particular conflict-
affected target groups, such as internally displaced persons (IDP) or at the population as 
the whole. Reintegrating IDPs, for instance, who had to flee their homes is important for 
the overall stability in the country. In post-conflict countries such as in Afghanistan, 
Rwanda or Cambodia, microfinance has been included in peacebuilding efforts, sometimes 
with surprising success. Although microfinance clearly targets a certain fraction of the 
market and are not able to cover all credit requirements of a country, it can positively 
impact poverty-reduction, self-employment etc. The banking sector could support the 
establishment of microfinance bodies, by refinancing microfinance institutions, setting up 
microfinance businesses themselves or supporting capacity building in existing 
microfinance institutions. 
Secure and mobilise funds for key infrastructure developments. 
The need for infrastructure reconstruction is typically high in post-conflict settings but funds are 
mostly scarce. Infrastructure is a pre-condition for national economic growth and the reconstruction 
of infrastructure is a direct growth impulse for the economy. Although international donors may 
pledge significant amounts of funds for rebuilding necessary facilities, the inflow of donor money 
normally abates after about five years (Collier et al. 2003). In order to generate necessary additional 
funds either at the beginning of a reconstruction period or in order to compensate for the declining 
aid-money after the initial peak, private financial institutions could play an important role. Providing 
money for infrastructure investments such as by establishing thematic funds would be an option. 
Given the typically high risks that dominate post-conflict contexts, specific financial instruments such 
as bonds, which reduce risks may be the most appropriate tool. Similarly, offering political risk 
insurances (such as those offered by MIGA) may be a useful way to encourage banks into supplying 
funds to infrastructure investments (Schwartz et al. 2004; Switzer/Hussels 2004).8 
II. Conflict-sensitivity 
As mentioned before, private sector activities can have unintended negative effects on conflicts. 
They can contribute to a further escalation of violence and sustain warfare. In order to avoid 
 
______________________ 
8   With the World Bank’s Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and similar national risk insurance projects such 
as the UK Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) or the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), 
international and bilateral donors have an instrument at their disposal, with which some of the political risks in post-
conflict settings can be mitigated. Experiences suggest that banks are among those sectors that most appreciate PRI. 
Moreover, given the catalyst function of the banking sector for other investments, it makes strategic sense for PRI-
institutions to emphasise the support of the banking sector in early post-conflict periods. Yet, viable business 
opportunities and an appropriate business environment still remain essential preconditions before PRIs can help to spur 
companies into realizing investments (Bray 2004). 
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negative economic consequences and enhance potential positive effects, actors active in the wider 
context of conflicts, such as development agencies, increasingly use conflict-sensitive approaches for 
their activities, analysing the (potential negative and positive) effects of their operations on a 
conflict setting. With respect to the financial sector, conflict-sensitive business practices have been 
so far only discussed for project funding (see International Alert 2006). Microfinance institutions 
have looked at their linkages with conflict to some extent, but seemingly not in a systematic 
manner. 
Conflict-sensitivity for the financial sector could include numerous dimensions, depending on factors 
such as the conflict-context, its root causes or the type of financial activity addressed. On a local 
scale, for instance, conflict-sensitivity can be important when financial institutions give loans to 
poppy-farmers whose revenues fund conflict groups or when ethnically segregated lending or hiring 
practices are common. Conflict-sensitivity should also be applied when banks try to positively 
engage in peacebuilding. Merely good intentions does not prevent activities from having unintended 
conflict-aggravating effects (see for instance Anderson 1999). If a bank, for instance, wants to set up 
a microfinance fund as a contribution to post-conflict peacebuilding, the fragile social and political 
environment demands for a careful and conflict-sensitive approach. Yet, overall, not enough 
experiences have been made so far with conflict-sensitivity in the financial sector. 
III. Policy dialogue and social investment 
Less specifically directed towards financial sector actors are “policy dialogue” and “social 
investment” as additional areas of engagement for financial institutions. While it is relatively easy to 
state what is special and specific about the contributions of the financial actors in the areas of 
“conflict-sensitivity” and their “core business operations”, it is less clear how financial actors’ 
contributions differ from contributions of other business sectors in the fields of “social investments” 
and “policy dialogue”. 
Business support to “policy dialogue” typically describes companies’ role in advocating for peace 
and promoting good governance and human rights. In some cases, public policy dialogues on peace 
processes are established, in which private actors can participate. Overall, public policy engagement 
is difficult to define and an area that can be a slippery slope for companies to step on, since there is 
no clear understanding about what their legitimate role may be. If companies engage “too much” in 
policy issues, they can easily be criticized for interfering in areas that are not considered “their 
business”. 
Similarly broad is the field of “social investment”. For many companies, activities such as 
establishing schools or providing money for sporting grounds is a typical social investment activity. 
Social investments -realized individually or as joint projects with other companies - do not 
necessarily have to have a link to a company’s core-business competencies, but they certainly can. 
Specific philanthropic activities in support of conflict-mitigation and peacebuilding can include 
“engagement in knowledge sharing with the public sector” (Switzer/Hussels 2004: 8) or supporting 
humanitarian activities. But also activities in the field of microfinance can be considered social 
investments. A prominent example is the foundation by Dutch Rabobank, which seeks to contribute 
to poverty eradication and development promotion through the provision of microcredit 
(Switzer/Ward 2004). With USD 60.5 trillion (in 2005) worth in assets held by the 1,000 largest 
banks, the shear size of the banking sector worldwide raises expectations about bank’s capacity for 
social investments (International Financial Services 2006). In fact, that companies, including banks, 
engage in social investments is relatively common, since many firms see it as a way to enhance their 
reputation and to “appease” communities that may oppose an investment. Yet, social investment 
can have negative side effects, especially in volatile conflict settings. Philanthropic activities have to 
be carefully analysed, implemented and monitored in order not to cause harm (Collaborative 
Learning Projects 2003b). 
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The information provided in the previous paragraphs suggests the following main conclusions 
concerning options and limitations to integrate financial actors into peacebuilding: 
1. The financial sector has potential with regard to contributing to peacebuilding and conflict 
transformation through its core business activities, conflict-sensitivity, social investments and 
policy dialogue. Many of the ideas for financial sector engagement are similar to those that 
have been discussed for other economic sectors or the private sector as a whole. Yet, the 
financial sector, including the local financial sector, can be assumed to have a particular role 
to play given its catalyst function for economic development and reconstruction efforts. For the 
microfinance sector, this role is already widely recognized. 
2. A challenge for any of the suggestions made on how financial actors may contribute to 
peacebuilding is the need to strike a balance between the financial institutions’ need to 
stay profitable and their social responsibility. It is neither realistic nor desirable that 
financial institutions “turn into aid organisations”. Ideally banks can realize peace-supporting 
initiatives on a win-win basis, with benefits for a country or community additional to profits for 
themselves. But for many initiatives, it needs an altruistic motivation or inspiration. 
3. Integrating the financial sector into peacebuilding can make a relevant contribution to peace 
but it is not a panacea for peace and stability. In some cases, there may not be any room for 
financial sector contributions, because the conflict setting does not allow for their engagement 
or because the financial sector is not in a position to assist. Financial sector development has to 
be embedded in a broader set of reforms and initiatives. Just on its own, it is unlikely that 
financial sector development can take off and make a significant contribution to the prevention 
and transformation of conflicts.  From the microfinance sector in post-conflict countries, it is, for 
example, known that grants are sometimes a better option than loans, when, for instance, the 
beneficiaries are too distressed by the conflict to be able to generate the necessary cash flow to 
repay a loan. Similarly, giving out microfinance loans to ex-combatants as a reintegration 
measure often generates little success as former rebels are typically not entrepreneurial enough 
to make good microfinance clients (USAID 2004). In some cases, financial institutions may 
simply not be in the position to support peacebuilding, since they were too hard-hit by the 
conflict themselves. Political Risk Insurances or other types of support may motivate private 
companies to embark on reconstruction and peacebuilding activities but they cannot guarantee 
support if basic preconditions are not fulfilled. 
4. One-type-fits-all-solutions would not work in the highly context-dependent environments of 
post-conflict countries. For each country a comprehensive and detailed needs assessment is 
required that should formulate the basis for any strategy to involve the financial sector into 
post-conflict pecebuilding efforts. Central questions that should lead the assessment are: What 
were the economic consequences of the violent conflict on the national economy? What are the 
general economic conditions? What are the specific consequences of the conflict on the financial 
sector? Where are the most pressing needs for reconstruction and post-conflict development? 
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3 Brief overview of the violent conflict and the 
peace process in Nepal9 
In 1996, the Communist Party of Nepal took up weapons to launch the “People’s War” in Nepal. 
Among the main goals of the insurrection was the abolishment of the monarchy as well as economic 
and social reforms in favour of the poor and disenfranchised parts of the population. Over the 
following years, the rebellion developed into a powerful conflict, considered by some as one of the 
most important guerrilla movements of the last decades. The signing of the “comprehensive peace 
agreement” (CPA) between the Nepalese government (Seven Party Alliance) and the Maoists in 
2006, formally ended the violent conflict but the following months revealed the fragility of the newly 
established “peace”. Political turmoil, postponements of the constituent assembly elections, and 
newly erupting conflicts in the South of the country characterised the political and social climate. 
Only by the end of December 2007, was a settlement reached, including an agreement to hold 
constituent assembly elections in April 2008 and a forestalled decision to end the monarchy in 
Nepal. In the summer of 2008 the constituent assembly then voted in a new president of Nepal, the 
Nepali Congress candidate Ram Barab Yadav. 
The emergence of the violent conflict between the Maoists and the Nepalese government can be 
traced back to a complex web of structural and immediate causes. In fact, long before the 
Maoists began their armed struggle, political and social conflicts had sporadically erupted into 
violence as manifestations of deeper-routed grievances and imbalances in the country. 
Politically, the conflict in Nepal was rooted in repeatedly frustrated attempts since the 1950s to 
establish reforms and a democratic system. Nepal looks back on a political history dominated by the 
rule of recalcitrant, aristocratic families and enduring conspiracies for the supremacy in the country. 
Between 1846 and 1950, the Rana-family tightfistedly ran the state through a succession of Rana 
prime ministers and allied landed aristocrats. After the king reassumed power in 1951, he introduced 
reforms such as the elimination of bonded labour and the abolishment of birta lands, a system that 
was installed by the Ranas to reward their allies with landholdings. Yet, the monarch still governed 
almost unrestrictedly and did not allow for elections. When Nepal held its first general elections in 
1959, the sovereign was not yet prepared to share power with political parties and dismissed the 
cabinet under emergency rule only about a year after the elections. The subsequent introduction of a 
new constitution and the Panchayat System resulted in few real changes in the king’s position. The 
Panchayat democracy prohibited political parties and the installed system of councils (panchayats) 
and a national legislature (rastriya panchayat) had de facto limited leverage over the king. With 
some - mostly cosmetic - changes, the Panchayat system persisted for nearly forty years. Only the 
formation of a vocal pro-democracy movement forced King Birendra in 1991 to dissolve the system 
and to install a multiparty democracy. 
But the newly elected government could not prevent the country from suffering endless political 
infightings between the different political parties. In the following years, governments changed 
quickly, none of them being able to surmount the internal political struggles. As a consequence, 
hardly any significant changes in the political, social and economic realm were achieved. To the 
contrary, corruption became a widespread phenomenon, undermining the trust of the people in the 
governmental institutions (Adams 2005). In 2001, the line of events following the royal massacre
 
______________________ 
9  This chapter is based on a range of sources, including International Crisis Groups website (specifically the Nepal website 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=1265&l=1), as well as publications by David Seddon, Thania Paffenholz 
and other authors (Seddon 2005; Paffenholz 2006). 
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and mounting human rights violations strongly demoralized the population. The people of Nepal had 
hoped that the introduction of a democratic system in 1991 would bring greater political freedom, 
social advances and economic progress, but they saw themselves confronted with continued elite 
power, abuse and economic decline. 
Socio-economically, the causes of the conflict are commonly ascribed to pervasive poverty, wide-
spread inequality between rural and urban areas as well as exclusion along ethnic, caste and gender 
lines that have plagued the country for centuries. In many aspects, the socio-economic causes of the 
conflict are closely linked to Nepal’s ill-fated political history. Amidst the underlying harsh living 
conditions, the state failed to offer reliable politics that benefited the poor and disadvantaged 
(Seddon 2005). 
Still today Nepal belongs to the poorest countries in the world and it is the poorest country in 
the SAARC region (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) in terms of per capita GNI 
(USD 250 in 2004). Also with regard to the Human Development Index (HDI), Nepal ranked in 2006 
only on position 138 out of 177 countries and was therewith third last among Asian countries before 
Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste.10 About 30 per cent of the national population lives below the 
poverty line (2004), and at the time when the Maoists took up arms, incidences of poverty were 42 
per cent, rising from a level of 33 per cent in 1976/77 (World Bank et al. 2006). 
Inequality is pronounced, with Nepal being the country with the highest Gini Coefficient in Asia 
(over 45) (World Bank et al. 2006; ADB 2007). Specifically horizontal inequalities along ethnic and 
caste lines were prominent and even increased with liberal economic reforms in the 1990s, although 
the caste-system was abolished in 1963 and the constitution of 1990 prohibited discrimination 
based on ethnicity, caste, religion or race (Deraniyagala 2005; Geiser 2005; Murshed/Gates 2005). 
Poverty continues to be highest among the rural population, among lower castes (e.g. Dalits) and 
some ethnic groups. Levels of human development also vary significantly between ethnic groups and 
castes. For instance, while literacy rates among the upper castes is about 50 per cent, literacy among 
lower castes is only about 30 per cent (Deraniyagala 2005). In addition, rural regions in the country, 
in particular the West, are characterized by lower human development indicators and more unequal 
distribution of land. By the mid 1990s, for example, only 20 per cent of the urban population was 
below the poverty line in contrast to 44 per cent in rural areas (Sharma 2004: 2). Rural areas were 
frequently not given sufficient attention in development projects, although agriculture (primarily 
subsistence agriculture) is still the most important sector for the country in terms of the absorption 
of workforce. Reforms addressing bonded labour (kamaiya) - which was only officially abolished in 
2000 - feudal structures in landownership, and widespread landlessness (sukumbasi) were often 
half-hearted and only partially successful. Agricultural productivity is low and given the sluggish 
industrial development, alternative job-generation outside the agricultural sector is overall 
insufficient, resulting in high levels of poverty and unemployment, especially among the youth 
(Deraniyagala 2005; Murshed/Gates 2005). Today, a modern private business sector is only in an 
incipient stage. Main industries include jute, bricks, cement, cigarettes, sugar, beer, garment and 
carpet industries and it remains to be seen if these industries can survive, given Nepal’s accession to 
the WTO in 2004 and the end of preferential trade agreements and quota systems for some of its 
products (Tibrewala 2004). 
Looking at economic data, Murshed and Gates concluded that “inequalities worsened in recent 
years, and group differences based on caste and ethnicity are central to explaining the genesis of the 
present conflict” (Murshed/Gates 2005: 10). In fact, the Maoists knew to capitalise with their
 
______________________ 
10  The statistical information is based on Asian Development Bank (2007): Key Indicators 2006. 
http://sdbs.adb.org:8030/sdbs/index.jsp. Accessed 14 November 2007. For the Human Development Index see: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. Accessed 13 October 2008. 
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Marxism-Leninism-Maoism rhetoric on the political and economic grievances of the population.11 
They defined their rebellion in class-terms, as a struggle between the Maoists and the government 
that stood for the traditional system of the country but they also gave allowance to ethnic and caste 
dimensions. The Maoists’ goal to abolish the Monarchy was an expression and symbol of a fight 
against the feudal and elite structures that prevented reforms for the poor and disadvantaged for 
decades (Mishra 2006). Over the course of the conflict, this rhetoric was increasingly successful in 
generating support among the lower castes, Dalits and ethnic minorities, which appear to “have 
begun to consider the rebel movement as a vehicle for challenging the economic and social 
domination of upper castes and elite ethnic groups” (Deraniyagala 2005: 53).12 
A list of demands (40-point memorandum) that the Maoists - under the leadership of Baburam 
Bhattarai - published shortly before they took up arms, illustrates the political and economic 
elements that - embedded in the Maoists ideology - appealed to a large number of followers.13 The 
memorandum included, for instance: 
• A new constitution should be drafted by representatives elected for the establishment of a 
people’s democratic system. 
• All special privileges of the king and the royal family should be abolished. 
• The domination of foreign capital in Nepalese industries, business and finance should be 
stopped. 
• An appropriate customs policy should be devised and implemented so that economic 
development helps the nation become self-reliant. 
• Land should belong to “tenants”. Land under the control of the feudal system should be 
confiscated and distributed to the landless and the homeless. 
• The property of middlemen and comprador capitalists should be confiscated and nationalised. 
Capital lying unproductive should be invested to promote industrialisation. 
• A minimum wage for workers in industries, agriculture and so on should be fixed and strictly 
implemented. 
• Poor farmers should be exempt from loan repayments. Loans taken by small farmers from the 
Agricultural Development Bank should be written off. Appropriate provisions should be made to 
provide loans for small farmers. 
 
Given these social and economic roots of the conflict, it is not surprising that the armed struggle 
started in the Mid-Western districts, where poverty is among the highest in the country and human 
development levels among the lowest. In addition, the growing sympathy for the Maoists in the 
early years after the beginning of the armed struggle, was considerably propelled by their activities 
against corrupt officials, exploitative landowners, moneylenders, and local officials. In the early years 
of the new millennium, the geographic centre of the conflict then expanded from mainly the rural, 
Western parts of the country to the cities (including Kathmandu), the Eastern regions, and the Terai 
in the South. By the beginning of 2004, the Maoists had managed to control about 80 per cent of 
 
______________________ 
11  Leftwing and communist parties have a long tradition in Nepal. The first Nepalese communist party was founded in 1949. 
Since then, the communist movement underwent many ups and downs and numerous splits and infightings (Sharma 
2004b). With the Maoists taking up arms, they brought their political struggle to a new level. The majority of the leftists 
are now united in the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninists), but there are numerous smaller groupings 
further to the left with the (Communist Party of Nepal) Maoists at the farthest left. 
12  The Maoists could later also expand their support base among the urban poors and parts of the “middle-class” that did 
not see the expected political and economic changes happening in the 1990s (Seddon 2005). 
13  Based on a copy of the 40 point memorandum, published on the South Asia Terrorism Portal: 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/40points.htm. Accessed 13 October 2008. 
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the rural areas and they were present in some form in almost all of the 75 districts. The process was 
accompanied by disruptive strikes, intensified violence, excessive use of force and a high number of 
human rights violations. The increased influence of the Maoists in the country became an immediate 
threat to the state and its elites, a “disruption of traditional local social structures and practices [that 
…] can also be seen as a liberating process, enabling those previously locked into positions of 
subordination and subjugation to be freed of these ties and obligations in a hitherto unprecedented 
fashion” (Seddon 2005: 24). 
Yet, given the apparent significance of socio economic factors in the emergence and escalation of 
the conflict, it is surprising that in the CPA signed by the Maoists and the Seven Party Alliance - a 
coalition of seven political parties, aiming to end autocratic rule in Nepal - economic factors are 
clearly subordinate to political issues.14 The peace talks culminating in the CPA in 2006 was 
preceded by two earlier attempts to bring peace to Nepal in 2001 and 2003. The Maoist’s main goal 
in the peace talks was the abolishment of the Monarchy and the establishment of a new 
constitution. But most of their other demands remained rather vague. The International Crisis Group 
wrote, for example, in 2005: 
“Despite the Maoist’s rise to prominence and the growing international concern at their 
threat to Nepal’s established polity, surprisingly little is known about them. […] The Maoists 
themselves have fed the confusion over their true aims with a plethora of seemingly 
contradictory statements” (International Crisis Group 2005: 1-2). 
The Maoists were presumably not prepared to negotiate economic issues in detail (interviews 
Kathmandu, 23 Sep to 4 Oct 2007). In addition, it is likely that changes in the political set-up were 
seen as a precondition and path to realize economic changes. Hence, in the CPA, the most relevant 
provision made was the constitutional assembly election, first scheduled for June 2007. The 
constitutional assembly was foreseen to make final decisions on the role of the king. In the 
economic realm, the accord made the following agreements: 
• end all form of feudalism and prepare and implement a minimum common programme of socio-
economic transformation on mutual understanding; 
• end feudal land ownership and formulate the policies for scientific land reforms; 
• adopt policies for protection and promotion of national industries and resources; 
• adopt policies to provide land and socio-economic security to backward groups like landless, 
bonded labourers, and other groups, which are socio-economically backward; 
• adopt policies to take strict actions against the people who have worked in government 
positions and have amassed huge amount of properties through corruption; 
• prepare a common development concept that will help in socio-economic transformation of the 
country and will also assist in ensuring the country’s economic prosperity in a short period of 
time; 
• follow policies ascertaining the professional rights of workers and increase employment and 
income generating activities. 
 
In addition, the parties agreed to end the collection of war taxes or extortion money, as well as to 
stop the illegal seize or capture of private property. The Maoist leader, Prachanda, later stated in 
one of his first public addresses that the Maoists would opt for a “mixed economic policy”, including 
drastic changes in the pattern of land ownership, while supporting “big capitalists” and allowing 
 
______________________ 
14  For a more general discussion on economic dimensions in peace processes see, for instance, a recent publication by Achim 
Wennmann (Wennmann 2007). 
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them to make profits. He also reiterated that “the party would promote national capitalists and 
make the country less dependent on foreign capital” (nepalnews 2007). To the private sector these 
statements sent mixed messages. While not fighting a free market order in principle, the Maoists 
made clear that foreign capital as well as the landed elite and large landowners would have to face 
losses. 
The time after the signing of the comprehensive peace agreement was complicated by the escalation 
of new conflict lines in the South of the country. In the Terai, the ethnic Madhesis launched violent 
protests, declaring the interim constitution and electoral system as discriminatory. Strikes and 
violent clashes continued to plague the Southern regions of the country, undermining the peace 
process as a whole and taking a significant toll on the private sector (see below). The subsequent 
political moves, such as the abolishment of the Monarchy, the constituent assembly elections, as 
well as the election of a new president are important steps towards a more peaceful Nepal. If the 
new conditions with the Maoists in the government are stable, this will be shown in the future. 
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4 Overview of the financial sector in Nepal 
Nepal’s geographic position as a land-locked country sandwiched between the economically 
powerful neighbours of China in the North and India in the South is an often cited factor for Nepal’s 
slow economic development mentioned in the previous chapter. Other structural aspects include 
the poor endowment of exploitable resources, the difficult topography, which restricts farmable 
croplands and makes infrastructural development difficult, wide-spread corruption and political 
instability (Dahal 2004), as well as the fact that “Nepal has begun its real development process only 
since the 1950s when the country was relieved from the century-long family rule by the Ranas, 
followed by the evolution of democracy in 1951” (Tibrewala 2004: 288). 
The overall low economic standard in Nepal clearly also influenced the development of the financial 
sector in the country. However, in the last two decades, the financial sector landscape in Nepal 
changed drastically in terms of depth of financial services as well as in terms of the range and 
quantity of financial intermediaries and may have turned the financial sector into one of the most 
dynamic sectors in the Nepalese economy. Financial activities, measured by households taking loans, 
went up slightly from 61 per cent in 1993/94 to 69 per cent in 2003/04 (World Bank et al. 2006) and 
the number of financial service providers went up from only five licensed institutions in 1980 to 180 
in 2005. 17 commercial banks (both private and state-owned), 25 development banks, 59 finance 
companies, four microfinance development banks, five regional rural development banks, 20 
financial cooperatives, 47 financial NGOs, and three wholesale institutions were officially registered. 
In addition, a plethora of unregistered financial cooperatives and NGOs are active in Nepal. 
Approximately 2,300 financial cooperatives and 15,000 financial NGOs are estimated to be 
operating throughout the country (World Bank 2007). 
Despite significant progress made in expanding financial services over the last decades, financial 
service provision is still insufficient. About a fifth of the national population is not financially 
served at all and more than a quarter has only access to informal financial institutions, such as 
family members, moneylenders, shopkeepers or landlords. In fact, a World Bank study suggests that 
access to financial services (measured in number of loan accounts, number of deposit accounts and 
the number of people per bank branch) declined again since the beginning of the new millennium 
(see also chapter on effects of the violent conflict on the financial sector) (World Bank 2007). Access 
to financial services is worse in rural areas and among the poor population. Although financial NGOs 
and cooperatives serve the rural and poor segments of the population also in the Far- and Mid-
Western Regions to some extent, the dependence on informal providers of financial services is still 
particularly high in these regions. But also in some urban areas, the importance of informal lending 
remains prominent. The main sources of informal lending are family and friends as well as 
moneylenders. Moneylenders tend to be more active in rural areas and among the poor (though not 
the poorest) parts of the population (World Bank 2007). The Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
estimated that formal rural finance institutions only cover about ten per cent of the possible demand 
in terms of lending volume (ADB 2006). In addition, whereas more than half of the population in 
rural areas does not have a bank account, only about a quarter of the population in urban areas is 
without an account. Indeed, while the rural areas and poor people can be considered “under-
banked”, competition between financial providers in the market segment of the wealthy in urban 
areas, particularly in the Kathmandu valley, is high due to the steady increase in the number of 
financial intermediaries in these places (World Bank 2007). 
The dependence on the informal sector is largely a consequence of the formal sector’s inability to 
sufficiently meet the demands of the people. While the informal provision of services is not 
necessarily a bad thing, severe problems may arise concerning lacking legal accountability or 
excessive interest rates. Interest rates by moneylenders range, for instance, between 36 and over 
100 per cent per annum. “In addition, they often receive either labor services or other small gifts as 
part of the loan request” (Dhakal 2007: 7). In Nepal, moneylenders are also a symbol of the feudal 
social structures, undue exploitation of the poor and long-term dependency, making them a frequent 
target of Maoists’ during the conflict. 
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Governmental efforts over the last 50 years to improve the access to formal financial services 
did not have the expected effects. Among the most important policies that the government 
introduced over the last decades were: 
• Directed lending programmes for priority and deprived sectors. The priority sector lending 
programme requires banks to lend four per cent of their loans to small businesses and other 
priority sectors. The deprived sector lending programme obliges banks to lend three per cent of 
their loan portfolio to low-income households, either directly or through intermediaries, such as 
microfinance institutions. The priority sector lending programme was phased out in 2007, since 
it did not have the expected effects. The deprived sector lending programme is still in practice 
but also faces difficulties since many banks prefer to pay fines for non-compliance with the 
deprived sector lending policy than meet the three per cent target. In fact, as of mid 2005 eleven 
out of 17 banks preferred this option (World Bank 2007). 
• A policy requiring banks to open branches outside the Kathmandu valley. For branches that a 
bank opens in the Kathmandu valley, it has to open branches outside the valley. Compliance 
with this policy is also flawed. 
• Introduction of new types of financial institutions with lower capital requirements, such as 
finance companies in order to raise the number of financial intermediaries in Nepal. The policy 
has in fact led to a mushrooming of finance companies and development banks.15 Yet, many of 
those are concentrated in urban areas. 
 
Among the most important finance service providers in Nepal are financial NGOs and 
cooperatives. They are of specific relevance in rural areas, for the poor, and for the provision of 
household loans. Financial NGOs and cooperatives, however, have been criticised for lacking 
capacity and professional staff, inadequate products, and fragile performance. The plethora of small 
financial NGOs and cooperatives typically lack the size and institutional capacity to be able to work 
sustainable (BWTP 2004). The idea of microfinance provision as a “charity activity” that is not 
required to work profitably is still widespread. Expansion into underserved regions of the country 
(such as relatively inaccessible to reach hill and mountain areas) remained sluggish despite high 
levels of liquidity, which exists due to the deprived sector lending policy, mentioned above. Nepal’s 
difficult topography and insufficient infrastructure, the low population-density in mountainous areas 
as well as unclear and insufficient legal regulations are key factors hampering an expansion of the 
sector. Although efforts are made to improve capacity of these institutions (e.g. such as through the 
establishment of resource and training centres), much still remains to be done (Dhakal 2007; World 
Bank 2007). 
Also part of Nepal’s microfinance market are the five Regional Rural Development Banks (RRDB), 
which were designed according to the model of Garmeen Banks.16 The banks were established 
between 1992 and 1996 in the five different development regions of the country and started as 
state-owned institutions (BWTP 2004; World Bank 2007). Although a restructuring process was 
initiated, including the privatization of RRDBs, they are not performing well. Undue overhead costs, 
loss of trust by depositors and a narrow level and area of operations seem to be central challenges 
for these institutions (Basyal 2004). 
 
 
______________________ 
15  In the last years, many NGO microfinance institutions transformed themselves into development banks under the 
Development Bank Act of 1996 (Wehnert/Shakya 2003). 
16  The Grameen Bank approach is a group-based credit approach for which no collateral is required. Peer-pressure is used 
instead to ensure that borrowers pay back their loans. 
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In contrast to most other financial actors in the country, private commercial banks have 
performed well overall over the last years. The absolute majority of private commercial banks could 
report operating profits although some of the private commercial banks were struggling with non-
performing loans or capital adequacy requirements.17 Most private commercial banks started their 
business in the early and mid-1990s after a first financial sector reform was launched in 1984 and 
when Nepal’s economy was growing at a decent rate. Private commercial banks are either fully 
Nepali-owned (such as the Bank of Kathmandu) or are operated as joint-ventures (for example 
Standard Chartered Bank; Nabil Bank; Everest Bank).18 A ceiling on foreign ownership (66 per cent 
since 2001; before 50 per cent) prohibits banks to be fully owned by foreigners. The group of private 
commercial banks is dominated by some bigger banks, including Himalaya Bank, Nabil Bank and 
Standard Chartered, but competition among private commercial banks increased over the last years 
given the steady rise in financial intermediaries in Nepal. Overall, private commercial banks are 
considered to provide better services to their clients, with a larger and more suitable range of 
products, more efficient service provision and a more professional management than state-owned 
banks. Yet, private commercial banks primarily serve the urban areas and are strongly concentrated 
in the Central region of Nepal, with 46 per cent of their branches in this region - although there is 
some indication that commercial banks have recently started to spread out to urban areas outside 
the Kathmandu valley as well as to some more rural regions (World Bank 2002). 
A major challenge for Nepal’s financial sector is the performance of the state-owned banks, Nepal 
Bank Limited, Rastriya Baniya Bank and the Agricultural Development Bank, in particular. In fact, the 
threat of a critical financial sector crisis triggered by the bad performance of these financial 
intermediaries alarmed international players and prompted the beginning of a comprehensive 
financial sector reform process in the last years.19 
The state-owned commercial banks established the biggest network of branches, with a large 
presence also in Nepal’s rural areas. Together they comprise about two thirds of the existing bank 
branches, owning more than ten times as many branches in rural areas in 2001 than private 
commercial banks (World Bank 2002; World Bank 2007). However, public commercial banks are 
notorious for high rates of non-performing loans. “Rastriya Banijya Bank and Nepal Bank Limited 
together, account for more than 80 per cent of total NPLs [non-performing loans] of the banking 
system, compared to less than 20 per cent in the other 15 commercial banks” (Sharma 2006). The 
problem of defaulters and non-performing loans is massive and problems related to the recovery of 
loans are severe. According to one estimate, the Nepal Bank was only able to recover Rs 5 billion of 
its nearly 21 billion in bad loans between 2002 and 2004 (Singh 2004). The problem of willful 
defaulters in Nepal is not only an economic but also a political issue that massively undermines the 
trust of the general citizens in the banking system of the country as well as the jurisdiction (see for 
instance Ohashi 2006). 
The main reasons for the poor performance of state banks are politically directed lending and bad 
payment behaviour; inefficiency and overstaffing; poor service; weak accounting and limited 
computerization; inadequate products and bad management, going along with a weak and 
fragmented legal framework for commercial banking and insufficient oversight by the Nepal Rastra 
 
______________________ 
17  According to an IMF report from 2006, “four private commercial banks did not meet capital adequacy requirements at 
end-2005/06, and three had NPLs [non-performing-loans] in double digits” (International Monetary Fund 2006: 13). 
18  Joint venture partners are mainly from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and the UK. 
19  Nepal Bank Limited - the oldest bank in Nepal - was founded in 1937 and is now earned to 41 per cent by the 
government. Rastriya Baniya Bank was established in 1966, is fully owned by the state and is the largest commercial bank 
in Nepal. The Agricultural Development Bank was founded in 1968 and is largely owned by the Nepal Rastra Bank 
(Central Bank) and the government, with a small percentage being held by small farmers. 
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Bank. The financial sector reform that was initiated in response to the crisis of the banks has focused 
so far largely on improving the legal and regulatory framework, strengthening the Nepal Rastra 
Bank, and restructuring the troubled public commercial banks. Although the reform process has 
made significant progress, much remains to be done, on issues such as the capacity of the Nepal 
Rastra Bank or the recovery of loans from large willful defaulters (International Monetary Fund 2006; 
International Monetary Fund 2007). 
To sum it up: The financial needs of most Nepalese are not supplied through any of the financial 
actors presented above. The formal financial sector has largely failed to serve large parts of the 
national population, which would be essential to supporting economic development, job generation, 
and risk management. Cumbersome and long-winded, bureaucratic loan processes, inappropriate 
loan products, inflexible payment schemes, and collateral requirements makes the formal financial 
intermediaries unattractive or inaccessible for most loan-takers. In addition, Nepal’s difficult 
topography, inadequate legal regulations, and a crisis in the state-owned commercial banking sector 
make it difficult for the financial intermediaries to serve the market. Liquidity, however, does not 
seem to be a problem for the banking system, also due to the deprived sector lending policy (see 
more on liquidity in the following chapter).20 Although financial NGOs as well as cooperatives 
compensate to some extent for the lacking service provision by commercial financial intermediaries, 
they also do not sufficiently meet the needs of the poor and the rural population as well as the small 
and medium companies. Given that about 85 per cent of the national population lives in rural 
regions, the need to expand the access to services to those areas is obvious. With their broad 
network of branches, the state-owned commercial banks have an important role to play in the 
provision of financial infrastructure, but other players, including private commercial banks also have 
essential contributions to make. 
One important example for the sluggishness of Nepal’s financial sector is its poor reaction towards 
the increasing inflow of remittances. In the last two decades, remittances mostly from Nepalis 
migrating to India, the Gulf countries, and the Philippines gained dramatic importance for the 
national economy: Remittances are estimated to account for approximately 12 per cent of the GDP,21 
being by far the largest source of foreign currency earnings. The number of households receiving 
remittances has gone up massively over the last years, providing additional income to earnings 
primarily in the agriculture sector (Graner/Seddon 2004). Although awareness with regard to the 
importance of the remittance inflow is growing and although formal service provision has improved, 
about 70 per cent of the remittances still come into the country through informal channels. Many 
migrants, particularly those living in neighbouring India, simply carry funds in cash over the border 
or ask friends to do so. This was seemingly also the preferred mode to bring money into Nepal 
during the time of the violent conflict, although there is some evidence that migrants feared to lose 
their funds due to Maoist attacks on their way to their home villages (Bray et al. 2003: 122).22 Yet, 
there was little momentum in the financial sector in Nepal to tap into the increased demand for 
formal remittance services. In fact, “remittances still can take from 10 days to several weeks to 
reach remote areas, and remitting through the formal sector is still expensive” (World Bank et al. 
2006: 77). A sufficient network of efficient financial institutions is particularly important to harness 
the economic and development potentials of the funds transferred as efficiently as possible. 
 
______________________ 
20  There is however a problem with parked funds, which are not used for re-financing financial institutions. 
21  Given that informal transfers of remittances are high, actual figures are assumed to be higher. 
22  According to some reports, a proportion of the remittances was taken away by Maoists cells based abroad (Bray et al. 
2003). 
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5 Economic effects of the violent conflict in Nepal 
In the following chapter, the economic impacts of the violent conflicts in Nepal are discussed, first 
for the private sector in general, and secondly, for the financial sector in particular. Looking at the 
private sector in general provides important background information to better understand the needs 
for post-conflict peacebuilding, to assess the indirect impacts of the conflict on the financial sector 
and to be able to compare the effects that the conflict had on the financial sector with those in other 
economic sectors. 
5.1 Economic conflict impacts and coping strategies of the private 
sector in general 
Loss of lives, destruction of infrastructure, production facilities, and markets as well as many other 
direct and indirect consequences of violent conflicts destroy economic achievements and hamper 
future development (Cranna 1994; Debiel 1996; Collier 1998). The adverse effects of violent conflicts 
can vary significantly, depending on factors such as the intensity and duration of a conflict, its 
geographic spread, or the capacity of a country to adapt to the new situation (Fitzgerald/Stewart 
1997; Stewart et al. 1997; Stewart et al. 2001). To accurately assess the economic costs of a conflict 
is difficult if not impossible, but estimations - some made with more sophisticated methods than 
others - are made for many conflicts. For Nepal, the annual loss of GDP during the conflict period is 
assumed to be between two and eight per cent. Graph 1 shows that GDP growth rates dropped from 
5.6 per cent to minus 0.6 per cent in the year 2002, when the people’s war intensified massively. 
Also in the years after 2002, GDP growth rates remained at a significantly lower average (about 
three per cent) than in the preceding decade (average about five per cent). In addition, private 
investment rates dropped from 15.4 per cent in 1996 to 12 per cent in 2004 (see for instance 
Dhakal/Sapkota 2004; FES 2005; Ra/Singh 2005; Seddon 2005) and exports fell drastically during the 
war period (Sharma 2004a).23 
Graph 1: GDP growth rates in Nepal, 1977-2005 
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23  However, the drop in exports cannot only be attributed to the violent conflict alone but is also an effect of the end of 
quota systems and preferential trade agreements in the context of the WTO accession of Nepal. 
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Costs inflicted by the destruction of infrastructure, such as telecommunication centres, power 
supplies, bridges etc. are assumed to be between USD 250 million and USD 900 million. A WFP / 
OCHA assessment of the impact of the conflict found that in 37 districts 1,143 cases of 
infrastructural damage were reported, including the destruction of agricultural service centres, 
airport towers, banks or cooperatives, bridges, drinking water facilities, health posts, police and 
army posts, post offices, roads, schools, telephone facilities, temples, industrial buildings, and 
governmental buildings (apart from Village Development Committee buildings) (WFP/OCHA 2007).24 
At the same time, development related expenditure went down, while security related expenditure 
went up.25 
The regions most severely affected by the conflict were rural areas and districts located in the Far 
and Mid-Western hill and mountain regions. The WFP / OCHA study estimated that about 55 per 
cent of the districts were highly or severely affected, while only about eight per cent were not 
significantly affected. 
Despite these negative figures, revealing detrimental conflict impacts for the national economy, 
Nepal can report positive developments with regard to the fight against poverty. The incidence of 
poverty fell drastically from 42 per cent in 1995/96 to 31 per cent in 2003/04. It is widely assumed 
that the massive increase in remittance from three per cent of GDP in 1995/96 to about 12 per 
cent in 2003/04 was a key factor for this positive trend. In fact, the World Bank suggested that a 
third to a half of “the overall reduction in headcount poverty rate” is due to the increase in 
remittances (World Bank et al. 2006).26 Although labour migration occurred already before the 
violent conflict escalated, it increased in the conflict years, probably as a consequence of declining 
income opportunities. 
Reliable information on the impact of the conflict on the private business sector is even more 
rare than macro-economic data and largely based on anecdotal evidence. The majority of the 
violence during the conflict happened between the Maoist armed forces and the national police and 
army. But private businesses as well as moneylenders and large landowners were also direct targets 
of the Maoists. From the early stages of the rebel movement, Maoists attacked multinational and 
large national corporations, such as Unilever Nepal, Surya Tobacco Company, Colgate Palmolive, 
Coca Cola, and several distilleries. Private companies were considered class enemies in the struggle 
of the leftists insurgency movement and as closely affiliated with the traditional elites (see also 
previous chapters) (Seddon/Hussein 2002; Thapa 2003). 
Demands for ‘voluntary’ contributions for the Maoists were also common for nearly all companies in 
the country, including small companies and big business houses, sometimes inflicting serious costs 
on firms. Some argue that extortion and ‘donations’ from businesses became the biggest source of 
income for the Maoist insurgency (Dhakal/Subedi 2006). A Nepalese weekly magazine, for instance, 
reports: 
“The extortion [on the East-West highway] takes different forms, such as forced ‘voluntary’ 
contributions of Rs 100,000 to support Maoist ‘cultural events’, protection rackets, 
 
______________________ 
24  The study was realized in 37 of the poorest districts in Nepal. Conflict was most severe in these regions, but allowance 
must also be given to the fact that due to the low level of development in these districts, they also belong to those 
districts with the lowest endowment of infrastructure facilities. 
25  Some donors suspended development assistance although most of the major projects and programmes continued to be 
implemented. 
26  Some qualifications have yet to be made. First, the poverty fell primarily in urban areas and significantly less in rural 
areas. Second, inequality also increased in this period of time, from a Gini coefficient of 34 to 41, being a result of a 
widening gap between the middle class and the rich. 
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checkpoints, tollbooths, and ‘taxation’. No businessperson we spoke to would dream of 
refusing, because they’re faced with guns” (Nepal 2006). 
Exact figures about the amounts of money paid in the form of “donations” are not known. 
Companies are secretive about the sums handed over to the insurgency, being worried about further 
extortions and fearing repercussions from the government, which does not allow for “the funding of 
terrorist movements”.27 
Other conflict related events, including frequent road blockages and strikes (or bandhs in Nepali), 
curfews and security checks further hampered business operations. Road blockages and strikes 
(together with the destruction of infrastructure) were a major impediment for all companies in the 
country. For instance, small producers in the agricultural sector, such as milk producers and small 
traders with only limited reserves are dependent on bringing their products to the market on time. 
Road blockages and strikes frequently impeded a timely delivery and inflicted losses and costs on 
producers as well as traders. According to estimates, a nation-wide strike can burden the economy 
with about Rs 630 million per day (approximately USD 10 million), not including the costs of Nepal’s 
informal sector (Thapa 2003: 144). Only in February 2004, for instance, the International Crisis 
Group counted four major strikes between one and five days in the Kathmandu valley, illustrating 
the seriousness of the problem. Bandhs have remained a major problem primarily in the Terai area 
even after the signing of the CPA. For the period from January to August 2007 nearly all districts in 
the Terai counted between 36 and 90 strikes; in the Eastern parts of the Terai even between 73 and 
90 (OCHA 2007b). 
Closely related to the problems of strikes is the massive increase in labour union activities over 
the last years. Trade unions have only existed in Nepal since 1945 and mushroomed after the 
restoration of the multi-party democracy in 1990. Newly formed unions began to gain ground also in 
the private commercial banking sector, which had relatively few labour unions in the past. Most 
trade unions are closely aligned to political parties and are heavily divided among each other 
according to their political affiliations. In the view of many, unions in fact tend to act more for the 
interests of their political mother parties than for the workers’ interests (interview, Nepalese expert, 
Kathmandu, 1 Oct 2007; Nepali Times 2007a). Concerns are raised that radical unions - frequently 
those considered affiliated to the Maoists - are used “to target the manufacturing sector, hotels, 
restaurants, and private schools” (Gaunle 2007) and to push through political agendas. Still, union 
groups on the level of individual firms often do not comply with the decisions made at the central-
level of the union, further complicating the trade union landscape. Although the challenges related 
to labour unions are not a new and exclusively conflict-related phenomena, the politicisation of 
trade unions have grown in the last years. One interview partner illustrated the situation as follows: 
“I give you one example: In a small carpet firm with 35 employees there are six different 
labour unions, each with their president and vice president, each making promises to the 
staff and making ever higher demands on the companies in order to get more members into 
their union. How should you be able to work and produce under those conditions?” 
(interview, businessman, Kathmandu, 8 Oct 07). 
Additional to the demands made by labour unions, private companies including banks increasingly 
face “ethnic requests”. Particularly since the increase of ethnically-motivated unrest in the Terai, 
ethnic groups began to demand companies to employ a certain quota of ethnic minorities in their
 
______________________ 
27  Companies were in part put in a difficult situation since they were on the one hand pressurized by the Maoists to pay 
“donations”, but on the other hand the business sector was criticised by the government for funding the insurgency with 
their “donations” (interview, businessmen, Kathmandu, 27 Sep 07). 
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firms. Some companies seem to follow these pleas, but concerns are raised about the qualification of 
those employed on the basis of their ethnic identity and about a general trend towards lawlessness, 
fragmentation and “blackmailing”. Groups, which make demands on the basis of ethnic or class 
reasons seem to thrive in Nepal. Given lacking law-enforcement, companies feel at mercy to these 
groups, which often make their claims violently or by threatening violence (interview, international 
expert, Kathmandu 5 Oct 2007). 
Overall, the persistent high levels of insecurity and the inability to plan ahead has undermined the 
business climate in Nepal. Although the conflict did not threaten the existence of the private sector 
in general, it aggravated many of the structural economic challenges that the country faces. For 
example, the already weak competitiveness of many products “made in Nepal” was further 
undermined by conflict-related difficulties to deliver products on time, due to road-blockages, 
strikes, destruction of infrastructure etc. Some companies may have benefited from the conflict, such 
as airlines, “because - despite of the cost - people would rather travel by air for safety reasons” 
(Jyoti et al. 2006: 15). But overall, conflict-profiteers seem relatively rare. After the CPA was passed 
at the end of November 2006, companies temporarily expected improvements in their economic 
prospects. The flaring up of violence in the South shortly afterwards undermined this hope. Negative 
sentiments and a pessimistic outlook on the future are wide-spread, making companies - including 
foreign ones - reluctant to invest (interviews, businessmen, Nepal, 24 Sep to 8 Oct 2007). 
Companies responded to the conflict-related obstructions and costs with different measures. 
Common coping strategies included the temporary or permanent closure of production facilities, 
capital flights as well as tightened security measures. Some companies are also reported to have 
relocated their business operations to neighbouring India. Particularly firms located in the Terai 
region or firms in Indian ownership that primarily served the Indian market and only came to Nepal 
due to governmental incentives, have transferred their activities across the border. Individual 
companies and business associations (such as the Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce 
and Industries) also entered into direct negations with Maoists. They negotiated the amounts of 
“donations” with the Maoists (interviews, businessmen, Nepal, 24 Sep to 8 Oct 2007) or, such as in 
the case of Pokahara, one of the main tourism hubs in the country, they agreed “to exempt tourism 
from their [Maoist] activities” (Dhakal/Subedi 2006: 421). In a rare occasion in March 2007, the 
business community responded to the persisting levels of insecurity with a three-day strike, 
protesting against the continued Maoist depredations and demanding from the government to take 
the concerns of the business community more seriously (Nepali Times 2007b).28 
In some cases, companies also improved working conditions in their firms when they realized that 
Maoists as well as trade unions managed to successfully mobilise followers based on the 
denunciation of bad labour standards. Large parts of the private sector in Nepal have a poor history 
of respecting labour laws, paying fair wages or implementing corporate social responsibility 
measures. Repeated unrest in firms (such as in brick-factories) ignited by labour unions or Maoists, 
impelled factory owners to introduce better conditions for workers, also for their own sake. In fact, 
there is some indication that companies providing decent working conditions were less frequently 
targeted by Maoists, than companies with poor conditions for workers (Dhakal/Subedi 2006).29 
Although many companies may still only pay lip-service to the importance of better conditions for 
workers, first steps have been made in some enterprises (interviews, int. experts, 2 and 5 Oct 2007).
 
______________________ 
28  The strike was triggered by the beating of a hotel-owner by Maoists in Kathmandu who declined to pay a donation to the 
Maoists. 
29  Other factors that seem to make companies more vulnerable to Maoist assaults were their national origin (Indian and 
other foreign firms were more frequently targeted than Nepalese companies); if they were known tax-evaders; and if they 
employed non-locals in their companies (interviews, businessmen, Kathmandu, 30 Sep and 5 Oct 2007; Dhakal/Subedi 
2006). 
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One of the most high profile endeavours of the business sector with respect to the violent conflict 
and peace process in Nepal was the establishment of the “National Business Initiative for Peace” 
(NBI). Inspired by a national conference on the “Role of the Private Sector in Peacebuilding, 
Reconciliation and Development” in which Nepalese businesspeople could learn from the 
experiences of South African business representatives in the transition period in their country, the 
NBI was founded in 2005. Today, 17 business associations are members of the NBI, including the 
Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FNCCI); the Hotel Association Nepal 
(HAN); the Federation of Women Entrepreneurs’ Association of Nepal (FWEAN); the Private and 
Boarding Schools’ Organization of Nepal (PABSON); and the Federation of Nepalese Cottage and 
Small Industries (FNCSI). The goal of the organisation is to 
“contribute to the larger peacebuilding project of the country through just socio-economic 
growth. […] The NBI is initiated to demonstrate the private sector’s stake in the conflict and 
its commitment to peace. […] We [the NBI] aim to redefine the image and role of he 
business sector in society as a crucial civil society actor capable of contributing to sustainable 
peace. We want to contribute to peacebuilding through practice of CSR (Corporate Social 
Responsibility) and by investing in socio-economic development of the country.” 
(http://www.nbinepal.org.np) (For more detailed information see also Jyoti et al. 2006). 
Despite the noteworthiness of the NBI, the initiative is facing some severe challenges: 
First, although the NBI initially found broad approval in the business community, the incipient 
enthusiasm could not be maintained. NBI largely lives from the outstanding support of one leading 
business man, but did not manage to generate sufficient clout among other members of the national 
business community. 
Secondly, while the NBI has decent access to representatives of Nepalese political parties, it 
struggles to establish channels of communications to the Maoists. 
Thirdly, the NBI is struggling to establish itself as an authority or important player among civil 
society organisations with regard to the peace process in Nepal. The business community is 
traditionally observed with suspicion by civil-society organisations in Nepal, given the corporate 
sector’s reputation of being politically opportunistic and as being a traditional supporter of the king. 
Business associations, for instance are presumed to mostly stand for the traditional business houses 
and the economic elite and not for the younger generation of entrepreneurs that may have had a 
more open attitude towards the peace process. In fact, the private sector is by many observers 
considered one of the weaker groups in Nepal (interview with Nepalese and international experts, 
Kathmandu, 1, 2, and 8 Oct 2007). Private businesses appear to be opportunistic with respect to 
their party alliances and are often entangled in corruption. One interview-partner described the 
private sector’s behaviour as “political prostitution”, giving the example that companies first 
supported the king when he took power but changed their views and turned to the popular 
democracy movement when the king became weak (interview with Nepalese expert, Kathmandu, 1 
Oct 2007). Moreover, the Nepalese business community is strongly divided along ethnic lines, 
between the Marwaris with an Indian origin and the Newars with a Tibeto-Burman background. The 
two dominant ethnic groups are partly represented in different corporate interests groups, viewing 
each other with suspicion and undermining the cohesion of the private sector (interview with 
international expert, Kathmandu, 2 Oct 2007 and Dhakal/Subedi 2006). Overall, there seems little 
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sense of unified action or unified position among the private sector, deteriorating trust of civil 
society groups in the business community. 
Fourthly, one important sector of the business community, the financial sector, remained absent 
from the NBI. Despite being invited to join the NBI, the financial sector (e.g. the Bankers Association) 
decided not to become a member. Main reasons for this were the assumed political nature of NBI’s 
activities and the concern of being brought into a difficult position with regard to some of the banks’ 
clients. Indeed, many of those affiliated to the NBI are clients of banks, some of them being serious 
defaulters and in a long-term quarrel with the financial institutions. The financial sector participation 
in the NBI would also have been important since the financial sector has a distinctive position within 
the corporate community in Nepal. Although most local civil society organisations may not 
differentiate in this way, but international observers point out that the private financial sector (not 
the governmental financial sector) is overall less entangled in the omni-present traditional elite 
structures than most other economic branches. Most of the senior management in private banks is 
internationally trained and keeps up relatively high professional standards (interviews, international 
experts, Kathmandu, 5 Oct 2007). 
Overall, most interview partners were sceptical about NBI’s bearing on the peace process. Some 
member organisations criticised NBI’s receding dynamism and the lack of concrete guidance on how 
companies can best respond to the challenges related to the peace process. The NBI is currently 
considering revising its membership structure and increasing its manpower in order to better 
respond to the needs of its members (interviews, businessmen, Nepal, 24 Sep to 8 Oct 2007). 
5.2 Effects of the violent conflict on the financial sector 
The Nepalese banking sector was a prime target of the insurgency during the violent conflict (see for 
instance Wehnert/Shakya 2003; Dhakal/Kanel 2004). Already in the 40-point memorandum from 
1996, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) (CPN (M)) stated that “Poor farmers should be 
exempt from loan repayments. Loans taken by small farmers from the Agricultural Development 
Bank should be written off. Appropriate provisions should be made to provide loans for small 
farmers.”30 During the violent conflict, financial institutions were part of the political and 
mobilisation strategy of the insurgency as well as a target of frequent attacks and extortions. 
Indeed, one of the first violent assaults by the Maoists was directed against a financial institution. 
On 13 February 1996 - the day when the rebels officially declared the “People’s War” - 300 Maoists 
vandalised a farmers development bank in the Gorkha district in the West of the country, setting fire 
to files and documents (reported in Rajamohan n.d.). Besides these direct attacks, financial actors 
experienced a wide range of indirect conflict-related impacts, mostly - but not exclusively - negative 
for the financial sector. 
Looking at the financial sector in Nepal in more detail, it becomes clear that the consequences of the 
conflict have varied significantly between different types of financial institutions. While state-owned 
commercial banks experienced in part grave losses, private commercial banks were considerably less 
badly hit. In the following section, the consequences of the conflict on microfinance institutions, 
state-owned commercial banks and private commercial banks will be discussed and their coping 
strategies will be presented. The reasons for selecting these three categories of financial service 
providers are their relevance for the financial service market in Nepal and the fact that the 
consequences of the conflict seem to be most varied between these three types of institutions. 
 
______________________ 
30  See the website of the South Asia Intelligence Review: 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/nepal/document/papers/40points.htm. Accessed 13 October 2008. 
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Together with the previous chapter on the financial sector in Nepal, this chapter should help to 
better understand the structure, as well as old and new challenges for financial service provision in 
the country and should furthermore be the foundation for assessing the potentials and challenges of 
integrating the financial sector in peacebuilding. 
Microfinance institutions 
The violent conflict in Nepal took a toll - in some cases a heavy toll - on microfinance institutions 
(MFIs). While MFIs felt the conflict since its beginning in 1996, most interviewees stated that only 
since 2001 has the conflict brought about more significant economic effects. In the same way as 
other financial institutions or the business sector in general, MFIs experienced a wide set of different 
direct and indirect effects from the violent conflict, but the severity of the impediments varied 
significantly between different MFIs. In comparison to the other parts of the financial sector in the 
country, considerably more is written about how the conflict impacted ones. Partly, this may be due 
to the generally bigger attention that is paid to the role of MFIs in post-conflict peacebuilding, but it 
may also be an indicator for how pressing the conflict-related problems of MFIs are. Based on these 
existing studies as well as own interviews, the following main direct and indirect effects of the 
conflict on MFIs can be summarized: 
Direct effects: 
• Frequent attacks and threats against premises of MFIs. Attacks typically included the 
looting of MFIs, arson, or the destruction of buildings and equipment as well as documents and 
records. The Small Farmer Cooperatives, for instance, counted that about 50 out of about 125 
branches were attacked during the conflict (Shrestha 2007). One interview partner estimated at 
least 500 cases of attacks countrywide. Attacks happened often at the time when instalments 
were collected and when more cash was available (interview, Nepalese microfinance expert, 
Kathmandu, 26 Sep 07). 
• the payment of “donations” to Maoists; 
• coerced drop of interest rates, when Maoists considered the interest rates charged by MFIs as 
too high and demanded a reduction.31 Interest rates in MFIs are typically high. However, it is 
widely agreed that given the elevated transaction costs, greater risks etc. the high interests rates 
in MFIs are justified and necessary to assure sustainability;  
• undermining of trust, which is essential for MFIs; 
• restriction of MFI staff’s mobility, when infrastructure such as bridges and roads were 
destroyed or blocked or when the security situation was not allowing for MFI staff to visit 
clients. In fact, some interview partners reported that MFIs did not have contact with their 
clients for over 5 years (interview, Nepalese microfinance expert, Kathmandu, 2 Oct 07). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________ 
31 In some communities that were controlled by the Maoists, the rebels attempted to replace banks with their own 
institutions, giving higher interest rates on deposits and charging less on loans (Sharma 2004b: 46). Most of these 
institutions were presumably not sustainable. 
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The most common indirect effects of the conflicts included: 
• declining financial performance;32 
• declining portfolio quality33 and in some cases increasing number of non-performing loans. 
This was partly due to households and small enterprises not being able to pay back loans, since 
they were economically distressed by the violent conflict. In some cases, customers also 
perceived the destruction of loan records by Maoists as a free ticket for not having to pay back 
loans, or followed the Maoists’ encouragement not to pay back loans. Statements from 
interview partners were rather contradictory with regard to drop-out rates. While some 
informants claimed that drop-out rates did not increase, others reported a significant increase in 
drop-out rates (interviews with microfinance experts, Nepal, 24 Sep to 5 Oct); 
• higher operating costs for MFIs, due to increased security expenditure and because fix costs 
stayed the same while business activities declined; 
• stagnating or shrinking outreach due to a slow down or decline in the number of (new) 
branches or clients; 
• some cooperatives did not increase loan cycles since members were reluctant to ask for bigger 
loans; 
• in some cases, insurances cancelled coverage when increasing numbers of losses were 
reported. 
 
The majority of MFIs were somehow impacted by the conflict, but interviews suggest that variations 
between MFIs were pronounced. Differences in the severity of the conflict-impacts were partly 
shaped by factors hard to influence by MFIs but were also influenced by MFIs’ ability to actively cope 
with conflict-impacts. Factors such as the MFI’s geographic location, for instance, influenced if an 
institution was more prone to attacks than other MFIs. Moreover, Maoists had overall a selective 
strategy with respect to the institutions and businesses they targeted. MFIs, which were considered 
to be associated with the Nepalese government (such as the Small-Farmer Cooperatives Limited - 
SFCL) were more frequently vandalized by the insurgency than MFIs that were considered 
independent (interviews, microfinance experts, Nepal, 25 Sep to 8 Oct). Similarly, those MFIs that 
were assumed to be funded by foreign governments, such as the USA, were more often attacked as 
the Maoists held an antagonistic attitude towards foreign donor engagement, particularly by those 
governments perceived as ideological enemies. In contrast, saving and credit cooperatives that were 
run by communities were less frequently attacked by the Maoists (interviews, microfinance experts, 
Kathmandu, 25 Sep, 2 Oct 07). 
MFIs also applied a wide range of coping mechanisms in order to actively mitigate the negative 
consequences of the violent conflict. The most important strategies included: 
 
______________________ 
32  Financial performance is typically measured with several indicators including the following: average performing assets; 
the return on performing assets, measuring the financial productivity of credit services and investment activities; operating 
cost ratio; operating self-sufficiency ratio, measuring whether a MFI has earned sufficient revenues to cover its cost; or the 
financial self-sufficiency ratio, measuring if a MFI earns enough revenues to cover the operating, financial and loan loss 
expenses while maintaining the value of their equity and quasi-equity relative to inflation. 
33  Indicators measuring the portfolio quality include the portfolio at risk ratio, measuring the amount of default risk in the 
loan portfolio of a MFI; and the loan loss reserve ratio, measuring the percentage of loan loss reserves which is set aside 
to cover potential default loans.  
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• (Temporary) closure of branches in insecure regions or relocation of branches to safer places 
such as district headquarters; 
• no further or restricted opening of new branches, specifically in the regions most severely 
affected by the violent conflict; 
• copying documents / records and keeping them in safe places in order to quickly resume MFI 
work in case of destruction of files;  
• changing routes of MFI staff when visiting clients in order to make them a less easy target for 
rebels; 
• reducing the amount of cash being held on MFI premises and/or being carried around by MFI-
staff when visiting clients in order to diminish losses in the event of an attack; 
• raising awareness about the nature of MFIs’ work. This included direct and indirect talks with 
the Maoists on the local level, press conferences and the setting up of signboards. The goal was 
to convince rebels of the positive, pro-poor character of MFIs. In some cases, MFIs had to prove 
to the insurgency that they are not associated to the Nepalese (such as in the case of SFCLs) or 
foreign governments. Many interview partners gave accounts of cases where clients spoke up for 
“their” MFI, not wanting to lose the institution that served them well. Although high-ranking 
Maoists arguably ordered attacks on financial infrastructure, some Maoists on the local level just 
“pretended” to target financial institutions in order to “follow” their superior’s order and to 
comply with, at the same time, the local population’s plea (interviews, microfinance experts, 
Nepal, 25 Sep to 2 Oct 07). 
• establishing or increasing insurance coverage; 
• reduction of the volume of cycled loans in cooperatives. Cooperatives normally aim to grant 
higher loans with every new loan cycle; 
• improving MFIs’ performance with regard to transparency, serving the poor, inclusion of 
women and minority groups etc. There is some indication that Maoists attacked more often 
those MFIs, which allegedly were badly managed or which worked in an untransparent manner. 
A GTZ report, for instance, stated: “It is reported that they [the Maoists] are rather tolerant of 
NGOs and local organisations which are conducted in a transparent manner and which deliver 
pro-poor results” (Wehnert/Shakya 2003). By improving their performance with regard to 
transparency, management, better services for the poor, women etc., the MFIs sought to reduce 
their risks of being targeted by the insurgency. In addition, clients and members of well-
functioning MFIs were overall more willing to defend the MFI against the Maoists than clients of 
badly managed MFIs; 
• setting up conflict-sensitivity trainings. SFCLs reported that some of the cooperatives 
unintentionally discriminated against women, Dalits and other disenfranchised groups, thereby 
contributing to the causes underlying the conflict. In specific trainings, cooperatives learned 
about how to become more conflict-sensitive and how to actively include more women and 
Dalits. In many cases, the training did not only improve the cooperatives performance and 
reduce their vulnerability to become a conflict target (see above), but also made them actively 
contribute to peacebuilding on a community level (interview, microfinance expert, Kathmandu, 2 
Oct 2007); 
• diversify products. Some MFIs made loan products more flexible, e.g. for those clients 
struggling to pay back in time. In this manner, re-payment rates increased again, which had 
declined when the conflict started. 
 
Most of the interviewees from the microfinance sector judged that the conflict impacts, particularly 
security risks, threats and attacks, impaired their performance but did not fundamentally jeopardise 
their operations. Indeed, although the microfinance sector was distressed by the conflict, the 
development of the sector was not fully stopped. The growth in the number of branches 
slowed down and the financial performance, portfolio quality and operating efficiency was 
negatively affected in many MFIs, though clearly not in all (Dhakal/Kanel 2004). Hofmann and 
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Grossmann found that “despite the bleak situation in Nepal, the loan and deposit portfolios of 
several MFIs and SFCLs remained stable or even grew during the conflict period” 
(Hofmann/Grossmann 2005: 6). Similarly, the Asian Development Bank pointed out that in the 
period 1996 to 2005 the “farmers’ and microenterprises’ demand for financial services has not 
waned” (ADB 2006: 5). One reason for this phenomenon may be that commercial banks have 
become even more reluctant to lend money in rural areas and focus on urban consumer lending and 
housing finance only. Several interview partners, indeed, stated that the conflict offered new 
opportunities for the microfinance sector, since the retreat of other financial institutions particularly 
from rural areas provided the chance to expand networks. In addition, the conflict impelled MFIs to 
be more creative in the development of new products and to be more sensitive about their social 
impacts and performance. 
Governmental commercial banks 
Governmental commercial banks are the financial institutions most severely distressed by the 
violent conflict in Nepal. They were a frequent target of Maoist attacks since the beginning of the 
civil war. Looting, extortion of donations, bomb threats, destruction of bank premises and records 
belonged to the most common forms of antagonism that governmental commercial banks 
experienced. Requests for donations already began in 1996 but increased in the years 2001/2002, 
when the Maoist movement grew. One bank, for instance reported 31 cases of attacks against its 
branches and a loss of cash and valuable goods in the amount of approximately Rs 165 million 
(approximately USD 2.5 million). Another bank counted 153 cases of vandalism in their 540 
branches. 
The reasons for the large number of attacks against state banks is based on the Maoists’ insurgency 
strategy as well as on the fact that state banks have a big network of branches in rural areas. The 
conflict in Nepal mostly took place outside the cities. Banks with a branch network in rural areas 
were, for this reason, an obvious target. The Maoists used the attacks against governmental banks 
also as part of their battle against the Nepalese state. Weakening the state banks was seen as 
tantamount to weakening governmental structures. Maoists, for instance, called on the people not 
to pay back their loans (see above). It should also be remembered that already in the 40-point-
memorandum from 1996, the state Agriculture Development Bank was explicitly mentioned and it 
was demanded to exempt poor farmers from repaying their loans. Widespread misuse in state banks 
and bad services for the poor ideologically justified the attacks - additionally, of course, to the 
obvious need to fund the Maoist movement. 
The fact that these banks were mostly government-owned, limited the bank’s options for coping 
strategies. The Maoists had proven to occasionally take up a pragmatic stance towards which 
specific institutions were targeted. As described above, MFIs (and to some extent also private 
commercial banks) had direct contact to the Maoists to negotiate and to thereby reduce the 
likelihood of being targeted. Being state-owned, this was less of an option for governmental banks. 
Some interview partners, however, suggested that state banks had, in some cases, better relations 
to the army and police to provide security, but information on this matter was rather vague 
(interviews, bank representatives, Nepal, 30 Sep to 4 Oct 2007). 
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As a consequence of the conflict, costs increased in banks, partly because security and insurance 
costs were raised, but also because staff costs swelled. One bank reported, for example, that for 
some vulnerable branch offices, the number of security guards was tripled from originally 20 to 
60.34 In some cases, incentives had to be paid to staff members so that they would work in bank 
offices in conflict zones; in other cases, staff could not be laid off and had to be paid even after a 
branch was closed. One interview partner estimated that operation costs increased by almost 25 per 
cent (interview, bank official, Kathmandu, 26 Sep 2007). However, some banks increased security 
measures only slightly and faced a less sharp increase in security expenditure. In addition, while 
state commercial banks were already plagued by a large number of non-performing loans before the 
conflict broke out, the number of clients that was not able or not willing to pay back their loans 
increased slightly in many governmental banks during the conflict. One bank, for instance, stated 
that the number of bad loans increased by four per cent during the conflict period, partly because 
nearly 6.000 of their clients were murdered, disabled or displaced during the conflict (interview, 
bank official, Kathmandu, 1 Oct 2007). 
The severity of the problem that the state banks faced is probably most apparent when looking at 
the number of branches that were closed over the last years. One state commercial bank reported 
to have closed or merged with other branches (such as in safer district headquarters) about 100 
offices from formerly 230 - more than 40 per cent. Another bank shut down or merged about 30 per 
cent of its offices throughout the country. (Graph 3 gives an overview of the development of private 
and governmental commercial bank branches in Nepal). This development also became apparent on 
a national level, with a “decline in outreach by formal financial institutions” (World Bank et al. 
2006: 76). Yet, while many of these closures or mergers may have been an immediate consequence 
of the conflict, some have to be seen in the context of the general crises of the state commercial 
banks. Many of the branches, which were shut down during the conflict, were economically unviable 
even before the insurgency began, struggling with overstaffing, bad management, insufficient 
numbers of clients etc. The violent conflict in this sense had a “cleansing effect”, driving out 
unsustainable banks and making space for better suited financial institutions. For the governmental 
commercial banks, this had the positive effect that they could then focus on more lucrative markets, 
typically in urban areas. In addition to the mixed reasons for the closure of banks, was also the 
increase in “bad loans” only partly a result of the economic impacts of the conflict. Many defaulters 
“free-rode” on the conflict, using the economic consequences of the civil war as a pretext for not 
paying back their loans. 
Since the formal ending of the conflict in November 2006, banks have initiated activities to help 
their recovery process. Although the still instable environment made it difficult to fully resume 
business in large parts of the country in the period after the signing of the peace agreement, banks 
have taken up a range of measures to deal with the impacts of the conflict. Among others, banks 
tried to recuperate records that were lost or destroyed during the conflict. During the conflict, most 
banks assumed a policy of keeping (electronic) copies of documents in safe places, similar to the 
practice also used by MFIs, but many documents were nevertheless destroyed. The recovery process 
has turned out to be slow and cumbersome as there were repeated cases of clients presenting false 
credit or account statements. Some banks have set up special committees that work on the 
restoration of records and decide on the authenticity of the claims made. Also in those cases where 
looted funds were insured, the recovery of the money has not yet been completed, given the 
substantive bureaucratic process that is required (interviews, bank officials, Nepal, 26 Sep to 3 Oct 
2007). Some banks also re-opened branches that were closed during the conflict period, but mostly
 
______________________ 
34  An increase in security did not always help as Maoists continued to attack banks, ostensibly in order to get into the 
possession of the security guards’ weapons. 
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it has been decided not to re-open all branches, since not all were viable. For example, one bank 
that had to close down 100 branches is planning on only re-opening a quarter to a third of its 
offices.35 
Governmental commercial banks also began to restructure and reschedule loans, waive penalties, 
give discount interests etc. for those clients, who were hard hit by the conflict and who are 
struggling to pay back their loans. The decisions on how loans can be restructured and rescheduled 
are made on a case by case basis, but in most banks a general policy is in place to guide this 
process. A limit to these recovery packages is the central bank policy that requires loan takers to pay 
back at least 25 per cent of the interest (interviews, bank officials, Nepal, 26 Sep to 3 Oct 2007). 
Graph 2: Number of commercial bank branches in Nepal 
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Source: Nepal Rastra Bank (2006). Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Volume XXXX, Mid-July 2006, Number 4. 
Private commercial banks 
Private commercial banks belong to the financial institutions least severely affected by the civil war 
in Nepal. In fact, private commercial banks could generate good operating profits during the conflict 
period. Given the strong impacts of the conflict on governmental private banks, the comparatively 
modest consequences for the private banks are remarkable.36 The main reason for the mild impacts 
is the geographic concentration of private commercial banks in the Kathmandu valley and their scant 
presence in rural regions where most of the conflict took place. Yet, we will also see later that the 
 
______________________ 
35  Nepal Rastra Bank allows banks which were closed down during the conflict to be opened again without extra formal 
permission. Moreover, although the minimum capital requirement was doubled in the new lending policy, those banks in 
very remote areas where other financial institutions are not operating, the minimum capital requirement is still lower, 
leading to more development banks opening in these regions. 
36  Allowance must be given to the fact that those interviewed outside the Kathmandu valley expressed a little more concern 
about the impacts of the conflict on their operations than interview partners located in the Kathmandu valley. 
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banks managed to successfully adapt to the new environment and could effectively harness from 
new economic developments.37 
Only few of the private banks that were interviewed for this study reported to have experienced 
direct attacks. Assaults occurred, but relatively rarely. One bank representative, for instance, 
reported that a cash collecting vehicle was attacked; other bankers stated that their non-banking 
assets, such as factories in the ownership of the bank, were a target of Maoist assaults; or bankers 
mentioned insular attacks against their premises. Most private banks, however, experienced 
repeated threats by Maoists or groups pretending to be Maoists, demanding “donations”. These 
harassments were widely perceived as intimidating for staff and management. Some interviewees, in 
fact, pointed out to difficulties in keeping good staff since many employees decided to move away, 
looking for a safer and more stable work environment (interviews, bank officials, Nepal, 24 Sep to 5 
Oct 2007).38 
Conditions improved slightly in 2006, but not to the extent most bankers had hoped for. In June 
2006, for instance, the Nepalese Bankers Association expressed its “serious concern” over the rising 
number of robberies and lootings of financial institutions. Despite the ceasefire agreement, a climate 
of lawlessness due to often criminally motivated violence persisted and made banks a frequent 
victim (BBC News 2006). Also, the increasing turbulences in the South took their toll on bankers. In 
addition, to general insecurities, an organisation called the “Association of Loan Affected People” 
was founded in the Terai about two years ago. Similar to the Maoists, the association encouraged 
people not to pay back their loans, blaming banks for exploiting the people. Although they have not 
inflicted severe damage so far, movements such as the “Association of Loan Affected People” 
increase insecurity for banks and further undermine the business climate. 
Different banks applied very different coping strategies to deal with the immediate effects of the 
conflict. Some increased their security expenditures by hiring more security personnel. Other banks 
found this not to be an effective solution since the rebels attack financial institutions in very big 
groups. Some private banks reduced cash held in branches, installed CCTV cameras, recording 
facilities for threat calls or held regular consultations with intelligence services. One bank outside the 
Kathmandu valley also reported that in response to the bad security conditions on roads, they used 
helicopters instead of cars to transport money. Insurance coverage existed in most banks as a 
standard policy before the conflict broke out (interviews, bank officials, Kathmandu 24 Sep to 5 Oct 
2007). A number of banks also negotiated with the rebels, some directly, others with the support of 
a mediator. Besides these measures that individual banks undertook, the Banker Association lobbied 
with the government for more security when threats against private banks increased. But most 
bankers interviewed considered the government as, overall, not very supportive. Remarkably and as 
already mentioned above, the financial sector did not join the National Business Initiative for Peace 
(NBI) as a way to lobby for peace. The official reasons given were the politically sensitive nature of 
NBI’s work in which the banking sector did not want to get involved in as well as the risk of a 
conflict of interest, since many of NBI’s members are highly-indebted clients of financial institutions. 
Some observers, however, interpreted the absence of the financial sector in the NBI also as a result 
of the moderate economic impact that the violent conflict had on this sector, reducing the incentive 
to participate in the group. 
 
 
______________________ 
37  Capital flight, especially to India occurred but was not a massive problem. 
38  In 2002, the government ordered to freeze bank accounts, which presumably belonged to Maoists (BBC News 2002). The 
policy was part of the government’s strategy to weaken the Maoists. Private commercial banks unanimously declared that 
they were not affected by this policy (interviews, bank officials, Kathmandu 24 Sep to 5 Oct 2007). 
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Depending on the coping strategies adapted by the individual banks, costs for security measures 
increased to different extents. One private bank reported to have experienced an increase in security 
costs by about 30 to 40 per cent. Costs were also inflicted on banks because staff had to be paid 
incentives for working in less secure branch offices. Little information is available on how much 
money was paid in “donations” to Maoists or groups claiming to be Maoists. The private banks 
themselves argue that they paid nothing or very little. Since paying to terrorist groups was 
prohibited and given the strict legal requirements for banks for transparent book-keeping, they 
argued simply not to be in a position to pay out “donations”. Yet, it has been reported that branch 
managers paid donations out of “their own pocket” or that money was collected among staff 
(interview, bank officials, Nepal, 3 and 4 Oct 2007). It is likely that banks found some way to 
compensate staff members and branch managers for their expenses when they had to pay 
“donations”. 
Banks closed only few branches as a result of the difficult security situation. One interview partner in 
fact argued that more banks, primarily joint-venture banks, would have left if the consequences of 
the conflict would have been more severe (interview, bank official, Kathmandu, 27 Sep 2007). The 
seldom closure of branch offices also has to be understood against the background of the thin 
branch network of private commercial banks outside the Kathmandu valley. Many observers, 
moreover, speculated that most of the branches that were closed were originally only opened to 
comply with the banking rule to establish branches outside the Kathmandu valley for branches 
opened in the valley. The bad security situation was used only as a pretext to close these anyhow 
unwanted offices. 
Additional to the relatively mild direct impacts of the conflict on the banking sector, indirect impacts 
also remained relatively modest. Nearly all private bankers interviewed for the report stated that 
they experienced losses due to the slow down in the economy and that medium and long-term profit 
targets were not met. Plans to expand branch networks also had to be postponed since security was 
bad and since economic prospects were not considered sufficiently positive for venturing into 
branches outside the Kathmandu valley. One bank, for instance, reported that they had intended to 
open up nine new branches in rural and more remote areas of the country, following a strategy to 
have offices in all districts. But the conflict thwarted these plans. Similar claims were made by nearly 
all private bank officials interviewed. 
Losses, stagnations and decline was experienced primarily in investment banking, structural loans, 
and in corporate products. Banks became, for instance, very reluctant to give loans to the severely 
conflict-affected tourism sector and private companies grew ever more careful in realising 
investments, given the volatile political and security situation. Yet, private commercial banks were 
largely successful in compensating for the loss in corporate banking by a noteworthy growth 
in retail banking. Retail banking and consumer lending were the main sources of profits for the 
private financial sector over the last years. Some of the banks changed their business operations 
quite drastically in order to respond to this new trend. Banks, for instance, with an original focus on 
corporate clients increased their retail business by 30 to 50 per cent in the last decade. An increase 
in housing loans, loans for motor-cycles, cars or televisions strongly shaped the banks’ businesses. 
High liquidity in the country, lack of investment options, interest rates below inflation rates, and 
drastic urbanisation leading to a growing demand for housing were the main factors driving the 
increasing demand for retail lending. Moreover, for the banks, retail banking is much less risky than 
corporate loans and clearly the preferred option in the difficult political and security environment. 
The high level of liquidity available in the country, is assumed to be mainly a result of the growing 
inflow of remittances. Some also argue that increasing barter trade with Tibet, money coming in 
from NGOs and international organisations, as well as a growing middle-class are factors 
contributing to the high liquidity (Dahal et al. 2000; Nepali Times 2003). 
The positive developments in most private commercial banks and its sharp contrast to the pitiful 
situation of most governmental banks caused - in the view of some bankers - a wide-spread sense of  
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jealousy. One interview partner said that “the private banks are seen as the new moneylenders.” In 
fact, the reputation of the private banks seems to have suffered during the conflict period for a 
number of reasons, among others, due to the politicised debate about the restructuring of loans. 
During the conflict and after the signing of the CPA in 2006, private banks, similar to their 
governmental peers, were repeatedly asked by the business community to restructure loans, wave 
penalties etc. in order to assist conflict-hit companies in their recovery process. Many businesses felt 
that the banks did not sufficiently respond to their needs. Or as one businessman put it: “Even 
during the time of the curfews,39 when companies could not operate for weeks, banks requested 
loan payments as usual.” The banking sector, on the other side, considered many of the demands 
made by the companies as exaggerated. On a case-by-case basis they restructured loans for troubled 
businesses, but they feared that many firms would use the violent conflict as an excuse for not 
paying back their advances and as the beginning of a rising number of non-performing loans. The 
matter developed into a sensitive politicised issue in which also private businesses tried to get the 
government on their side, demanding from the state to support them in getting better terms on their 
loans and credits from banks. 
The resilience of private commercial banks in Nepal amidst conflict seems to have facilitated another 
interesting development that became slowly apparent since the end of 2006 and which is crucial 
also with respect to post-conflict reconstruction. The signing of the CPA in November 2006 gave 
impetus among private commercial banks to re-consider their plans to expand branch networks in 
Nepal, specifically outside Kathmandu. This development is remarkable, particularly since 
private banks were, in the past, frequently criticised for being overly risk-averse, insufficiently 
creative and for not looking enough at the rural areas of Nepal as a market for their services 
(interviews, international and local experts and governmental officials, Kathmandu, 24 Sep to 5 Oct 
2007). Incipient plans to expand the branch network were halted during the time of the conflict, 
given the insecure environment. But by 2006, expectations were high that the security situation and 
political conditions would be stable enough to allow for the opening of new offices as well as for the 
offering of new products, particularly suited for the more remote and rural areas. Some interview 
partners form commercial banks, for instance, planned on offering agricultural loans or similar 
products and some began to slowly open up new offices in areas outside the Kathmandu valley, 
remarkably including remote regions. Nearly all of the interview partners from private commercial 
banks, in fact stated that they were at some stage of planning or realising investments in more 
remote regions. During the time of the research, it was, however, not possible to find clear statistical 
information supporting these claims. Available statistics did not, for instance, differentiate between 
private commercial banks and state commercial banks. According to the statistics, there were 
altogether 375 branches in 2004 and 2005, signifying the years with the lowest number of bank 
branches in Nepal. By mid 2006, the numbers had risen again to 390 branches (Nepal Rastra Bank 
2006). According to interview partners, most of the growth in fact happened in the Hill areas and 
the Terai region and due to commercial private banks. However, it was not possible to confirm this 
with the available statistical data. 
 
 
 
 
______________________ 
39  King Gyanendra established a new cabinet beginning of 2004, given heavy protests by political parties, students and civil 
society organisations against the lack of democracy. But the king dismissed the government some months later, assumed 
power and began to control the country under the state of emergency. Central constitutional rights were suspended, 
activists and political critics were arrested, and communication facilities between Nepal and the world were largely closed 
down. 
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Interview partners gave four main reasons for their new interest in expanding their businesses to 
more remote regions: 
• the considerable inflow of remittances allows for new business opportunities outside the valley; 
• the competition between banks and other financial institutions in the Kathmandu valley is 
growing rapidly, encouraging banks to look for new markets in other geographic regions; 
• with the opening of the Nepalese market in 2010 to foreign financial service providers in the 
context of Nepal’s accession to the WTO, Nepalese banks will be exposed to even more 
competition. They want to tap into the national market before foreign competitors can do so; 
• the good financial conditions most private banks are in, allows them to venture into new 
markets. 
 
But the developments after November 2006 with continued political crises and newly flaring up 
violence largely frustrated the banks’ expansion plans (interviews, bank officials and government 
representatives, Kathmandu, 24 Sep to 5 Oct 2007). Although the political instabilities slowed down 
private financial institutions in exploring these markets, the interest is noteworthy, particularly given 
the retreat of governmental banks from rural regions in the context of the conflict. 
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6 “Financial peacebuilding” - contributions by the 
private sector 
The financial sector is assumed to have a catalyst role in advancing economic development. Looking 
from a peacebuilding perspective, this role can be especially beneficial in peacebuilding efforts when 
poverty and unequal development are at the root of the conflict. Contributing to poverty reduction 
can be crucial for sustainable conflict transformation and in preventing countries from relapsing into 
war. Also with regard to more general and immediate post-conflict and reconstruction needs, 
financial sector actors may be able to assist, such as by providing funds for infrastructure rebuilding 
or supporting loan-mechanisms to IDPs, returning to their homes. For some of these options of 
engagement, it may be possible to create - under specific circumstances - direct win-win 
arguments, such as for the expansion of financial infrastructure. For others, such as providing loans 
or even grants to IDPs, the bank’s motivation needs to be social responsibility, with a long-term 
view on the (stability, reputational and economic) returns on its engagement. 
It is often argued that financial institutions are particularly dependent on a stable and safe working 
environment. They are reluctant to invest in countries where banking regulations are weak and 
where political and security conditions are volatile. Yet, it seems to be necessary to distinguish 
between different types of financial intermediaries. Experiences made with microfinance institutions 
in conflict and post-conflict contexts, for instance, seem to suggest that MFIs are less reliant on a 
stable political and legal environment than originally thought. Similar to MFIs, local banks may also 
have a particular role to play when it comes to operating in conflict contexts. They are “already 
there”, are more familiar with the terrain, and feel arguably more responsible for the place than 
foreign financial actors. Local financial institutions - if they endured the conflict - could therefore 
play an important role in supporting peacebuilding and bridging the period between the formal 
ending of a conflict and the beginning of investments by international banks. 
The main goal of the research is to look specifically at the role of this local financial sector (primarily 
private banks) and to explore for the case of Nepal, how the conflict impacted these institutions, 
how they responded to the conflict and what the potentials and limits for their engagement in 
peacebuilding may be. In spite of the conflict, a relatively healthy private financial sector exists in 
Nepal, side by side ailing governmental financial institutions and a plethora of partly effective, partly 
ineffective microfinance organisations. The conflict primarily hit the governmental banks and some 
of the microfinance institutions. The local private commercial banks only experienced comparatively 
mild effects as a result of the conflict. These findings suggest that the local commercial banks could 
assume a particular role in peacebuilding in Nepal. Most of the banks are presumably financially 
healthy enough to support peacebuilding activities and private commercial banks recently showed 
interest in going to more rural areas, which may provide options for combining their business 
interest with peacebuilding goals. But overall, the (private) financial sector has hardly considered 
concrete ways of how to support conflict transformation and the establishment of a sustainable, 
peaceful environment. 
In the following paragraphs, the information provided in the previous chapters is analysed and 
further discussed in order to get a better understanding on the limits and potentials of financial 
sector engagement in peacebuilding. 
Conflict impacts on the financial sector and coping strategies 
Already before the violent conflict broke out in Nepal in 1996, the financial sector landscape was 
characterised by insufficient remittance transfer services as well as lacking financial services for the 
rural population and for small and medium companies. In addition, a high number of default loans, 
bad management, inadequate regulations and supervision brought the financial sector in Nepal 
close to a collapse. The decade long conflict between the Maoists and the government further 
troubled the financial sector, but had severe effects only on some actors and in some regards. The 
conflict did not lead to a complete break down of the financial infrastructure, as was reported from 
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other countries, such as Sierra Leone or Somalia. It much rather - like some other guerrilla wars - 
only brought about partial distress. In fact, a number of positive developments occurred during 
the conflict period, potentially helping the financial sector to evolve. Informal moneylenders, for 
example, who were mostly active in rural regions, charged exorbitant interest rates and led loan-
takers into a situation of structural dependence - were expelled from their villages in large numbers. 
Similarly, some of the weaker microfinance institutions and banks were cast out from rural regions. 
The conflict also, rather awkwardly, boosted (labour) migration, thereby increasing remittances 
inflow and hence liquidity, which turned out to be a facilitating factor for the growing retail business 
of private commercial banks, which again helped them to endure the conflict period quite profitably. 
On the negative side, the civil war inflicted significant costs for financial institutions, primarily for 
governmental banks, but also to MFIs and private commercial banks. It undermined trust, threw 
back plans to expand branch networks, and reduced lending to the corporate sector. The retreat of 
(state) banks from rural areas, inflicted by the substantial assaults against governmental banks, 
diminished the financial infrastructure in these regions and strengthened informal lending, mostly 
from family and friends.40 Some people in remote and more instable regions could not be served for 
a long period of time by their microfinance institutions due to security reasons. 
The conflict seemingly also brought out some fundamental discontent of the population with 
the financial sector or may have even worsened the financial sector’s reputation. Scandals 
surrounding politically motivated lending and default loans had undermined the trust of the general 
population in the financial sector already before the conflict erupted. The financial sector - primarily 
the mismanaged state banks - was largely seen as part and parcel of the crony elite system. The 
insurgency directly capitalised on these deficiencies. In fact, ideologically, the attacks against banks 
and the Maoists’ encouragement not to pay back loans are not only part of their leftist economic 
convictions.41 They also have to be understood as an element of their rebellion against the clientelist 
and feudal economic and political structures.42 The private commercial banks were not spared from a 
declining reputation. In contrast to the governmental banks, the private commercial banks were a 
comparatively rare target of Maoists’ attacks, largely because of the small number of branch offices 
in the main conflict zones. While this geographic dimension may have saved private banks from 
some of the most severe direct impacts of the conflict, they still felt some of the indirect 
consequences of the conflict, such as declining reputation and diminishing trust. Private banks are, 
for example, looked upon with suspicion because of the large profits they generated in the last 
decade despite the overall economic downturn. The politicised debate about their lack of willingness 
to help troubled businesses by restructuring loans placed them also in a bad light. The perception of 
the private banks as the “new moneylenders” is of distinct explosiveness in the anti-feudal political 
discourse that grew during the conflict. Although the private banks may be one of the sectors in 
Nepal least entangled with the ubiquitous cronyism, given their professionally trained management, 
the banks are perceived in the current political contexts and predominantly social and economic 
templates as part of the traditional system. Groups such as the recently established “Association of 
Loan Affected People”, which seemingly copied the Maoists’ demands and took advantage of the 
general lawlessness in the country, may be another indication for the dissatisfaction of the 
 
______________________ 
40  The expanding informal lending was also made possible by the big liquidity in the country. 
41  Maoists, of course, also needed to generate funds for the movement. 
42  The fact that the insurgency also targeting micro-finance institutions with a clear pro-poor mission seems to suggest that 
little differentiation was made between the various financial players and that MFIs’ operating principles were not always 
understood (e.g. with regard to high interest rates). Only when MFIs, supported by the (rural) population set out their 
mandates and intentions, MFIs were in part spared from attacks. 
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population with the financial system. But it also shows the sector’s vulnerability towards allegedly 
socially motivated claims and illustrates the fact that in a conflict environment no player can stay 
neutral, even if the private banks see themselves largely distant from the conflict. 
It is highly problematic to assess how the financial sector in Nepal would have developed without 
the emergence of the civil war. From the information collected for this study, it can be assumed that 
the purging of inefficient (state) banks in rural areas would not have been as pronounced as without 
the conflict. But it can be assumed that more private financial institutions would have opened new 
branches in rural areas. As stated above, private banks entertained the plan to expand into areas 
outside the Kathmandu valley for some time, but had to hold off because of the insecure 
environment. Whether many of the structural problems of the financial sector would have been more 
effectively addressed in a peaceful environment, is impossible to answer. The conflict seemingly 
aggravated some of the fundamental deficiencies, such as the provision of financial infrastructure. 
Others, however, such as the lack of lending to SMEs or insufficient transfer mechanisms for 
remittances remained largely unchanged by the conflict. 
Peacebuilding tasks 
Focusing on private commercial banks (while also including governmental commercial banks and 
microfinance institutions in order to get a more comprehensive picture of the financial sector 
landscape), the findings from the study suggest that private commercial banks have a potentially 
constructive role to play in peacebuilding. A number of reasons and specific fields of engagement 
can be identified: 
• The remarkable economic profitability that they sustained despite the conflict. Private 
commercial banks stood out with respect to how they were impacted by the conflict and how 
they managed to continue to generate profits. Banks, particularly governmental banks that were 
severely hit by the conflict and were already in “bad health” before the conflict emerged, may 
struggle to allocate necessary resources for peacebuilding-oriented activities. The private 
commercial banks seem to be in a much better economic position to assist in peacebuilding. 
Their relative economic prosperity also stands in sharp contrast to many of the cases, which so 
far have been discussed in the literature (e.g. Somalia, Afghanistan) and where the commercial 
financial sector was nearly fully depleted. 
• It could be argued that private commercial banks may not have enough incentive to support 
peacebuilding, simply because they did not “sufficiently” feel the negative impacts of the 
conflict. Yet, private banks also stated that they fell behind their economic medium and long-
term targets because of the conflict and that a peaceful environment was overall more 
conducive for them than war. Moreover, those banks that opened new branches in regions 
outside the Kathmandu valley, may have a particular interest not to lose their new investments 
because of up-flaring violence. 
• The violent conflict in Nepal had a positive “cleansing effect” on the financial sector landscape. 
This together with issues, such as the increased need for formal remittance services offers new 
market opportunities for formal commercial financial actors. 
• International banks are not very likely to come to Nepal soon. Given the relatively small 
Nepalese market, the continuously volatile political situation as well as restrictions on foreign 
ownership of banks, it is doubtful that foreign banks will enter Nepal in big numbers in the near 
future. The opening of the financial market in 2010 in the context of Nepal’s WTO accession may 
bring some momentum into the financial landscape, but whether that is sufficient to attract 
foreign investments remains to be seen. For this reason, local banks have a particular role to 
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play with regard to “financial peacebuilding”. They are familiar with the political conditions and 
the market in order to assume some of the peacebuilding tasks, which so far have only been 
discussed for international banks. 
• Private financial institutions do not seem to be entangled in cronyism in the same way as most 
other economic actors. For this reason, they may have less to lose from a “new social and 
political dynamic” than the traditional feudal elite and may be more open to overcome the 
traditional social frameworks, as is aimed for in the political and social peacebuilding process. In 
fact, interview partners frequently ascribed a high level of professionalism to the private 
commercial banks. It is known from other peace processes such as in Guatemala, that the 
structural inter-dependence of the traditional economic elite with the status quo, often makes 
these economic actors an unreliable partner for peacebuilding (Joras 2007). The presumably 
rather rare entanglement of private commercial bankers with the traditional economic elite, may 
make them a particularly interesting player for peacebuilding in Nepal. 
 
A structural way of how financial institutions could assist in peacebuilding, is by contributing to a 
better provision of financial service infrastructure in Nepal. As stated before, financial services are 
widely assumed to have a direct impact on poverty reduction. As poverty was a central cause for the 
emergence of the violent conflict in Nepal, supporting to reduce the root causes of poverty and 
unequal development may be one of the most effective contributions of the financial sector to 
peacebuilding. Additional to these structural ways of assisting sustainable peacebuilding, there are 
a range of activities that could be directed towards the more immediate reconstruction needs. 
Activities could include: 
• improved financial service provision for the poor population, especially in the rural and 
more remote areas, such as by broadening the network of branches; 
• offering agricultural loans in rural areas and other financial products, which better suit the 
needs of the population; 
• support loan-mechanisms for IDPs returning to their homes. No detailed figures are available 
on the number of people uprooted by the conflict in Nepal. The most widely circulated figures 
estimate that there are between 100,000 and 200,000 IDPs, but only a small number is officially 
registered (OCHA 2006; OCHA 2007a). Although it is commonly assumed that since April 2006, 
thousands of IDPs have returned to their homes (on their own steam or supported by NGOs), the 
majority of IDPs still do not dare to return. One of the reasons why people are reluctant to go 
back is, apart from the instable security situation, also the lacking opportunities to make a living 
in their home villages and towns (OCHA 2006).43 
• supporting MFIs through capacity building and by refinancing; 
• improved lending for SMEs; 
• provide assistance to conflict-hit companies by restructuring loans or offering seed-money to 
adequate conditions; 
• enhance long-term lending, such as for infrastructure projects; 
• offering more and better services for the transfer of remittances and developing products 
to effectively use diaspora funding for development. An option would be to analyse the informal 
remittance services and try to establish connections; 
 
______________________ 
43  Although the government has plans for support packages, payable to returnees, the project has not been realised as of 
yet. Of those people who left their homes, it is probably the subsistence farmers who are most in need for support, but 
overall knowledge on the needs of the people is still scant. Among the IDPs there are also many landowners, 
moneylenders and other village elite who left their homes due to threats from Maoists. In fact some interview partners 
also assumed that those wealthy IDPs had little reason to return to their original homes. Many fled to Kathmandu, buying 
houses in the valley and building a new life. 
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• introduce conflict-sensitivity screenings and measures into financial service provision in order 
to assure that the benefits of financial services are maximised and the detriments minimised. 
 
While most of these activities listed above address issues that were identified as shortcomings of the 
financial sector long before the violent conflict erupted, others only emerged as a reaction to the 
conflict. Further, of those shortcomings that existed prior to the conflict, the need to address them 
increased in relevance and urgency with the emergence of the conflict. With the destruction of 
infrastructure facilities, for instance, during the course of the conflict, there was a bigger need for 
long-term financial resources for reconstruction efforts. Similarly, the increase of remittance inflow 
during the conflict made the provision of effective transfer services more pertinent. Other issues, 
however, stayed largely unchanged during the conflict. Many of the reasons why the (private) 
financial sector has not yet tapped into the un-served markets are related to hindrances that have 
existed in the same or similar way as they did before the conflict. Low population density, difficult 
geographic conditions or insufficient legal regulations form and formed severe impediments for 
accessing these markets and may continue to deter private banks’ engagement in these regions. 
Similarly, problems such as frequently changing political scenarios that make it difficult to plan 
ahead will almost certainly be problematic in the next years. In fact, looking at a number of 
publications on the financial sector in Nepal, there is a widespread agreement that large parts of the 
financial market are not profitable for private commercial banks. The ADB concluded, for example: 
„A high risk rural finance profile, repressive policy environment, and security concerns in 
rural areas make private sector participation in RF [rural finance] extremely difficult. Difficult 
terrain and topography inhibits rapid deployment of private institutional RF services on a 
larger scale. Wider sector reform is required to address the policy and institutional 
bottlenecks to growth and development of efficient and sustainable RF services for the poor” 
(ADB 2006). 
Contrary to this assessment, it is remarkable that since the end of the conflict, private banks showed 
unprecedented interest in opening up new offices in areas that they largely ignored in the past. 
Sometimes these new offices are “only” located in district headquarters; other times, however, they 
are based in astonishingly remote regions. It is, however, important to understand that the motives 
for entering into these fields are not founded on the desire to support peacebuilding. Much rather, 
this development is driven by economic rationales, including new market potentials due to the 
inflow of remittances and increased competition in their traditional urban markets. Yet, it should be 
remembered that the private commercial sector was frequently criticised for not being creative 
enough or willing to tap into the market outside the Kathmandu valley. It is much too early to judge 
the potential of this relatively new development and to assess if this is in fact a new trend that will 
grow over the next years or not. The swelling attraction that the markets outside the Kathmandu 
valley seem to have for the local private banks, could well hold the potential for a fruitful win-win 
situation, in which the banks expand into new markets and thereby assist in poverty reduction and 
peacebuilding.44 But at the time when the field-work was undertaken, there was little indication that 
the government realised any concrete policy measures to support the banks in their “expansion” 
endeavours. Given that since the peace talks in 2006, economic topics were largely submerged into 
political topics, this does not come as a big surprise. In addition, it has to be taken into 
consideration that the relationship between the private financial sector and the government is per se 
strained and shaped by mutual suspicion. State assistance to private commercial banks to enforce 
their expansion (e.g. with tax breaks) may be an appropriate mechanism to support economic 
 
______________________ 
44  Private banks have also recently pledged money for infrastructure investments. The fund is not explicitly directed towards 
reconstruction efforts but requires a longer-term commitment of the private banks. 
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peacebuilding. MFIs may to some extent have closed the gap that the shut down of state bank 
branches left in rural regions, but it is obvious that there is still demand for more formal financial 
services. 
While win-win situations, as described above, may be pivotal to encourage private business actors 
to support peacebuilding endeavours, corporate social responsibility and philanthropy are also 
important driving forces. Governmental banks do not currently seem to be in a condition to pay 
much attention to corporate social responsibility, since - as one interviewee stated - “we have other 
things to do at the moment; we have to restructure this bank first.” Other governmental bankers 
pointed out that with their mandate to support development in Nepal, they already respond to 
corporate responsibility demands (interview, bank official, Kathmandu, 26 Sep 2007). Private 
commercial banks have, so far, failed to pay much attention to CSR or social investments. A number 
of private banks advertise their corporate responsibility engagements on their websites, but they 
predominately consist of unstructured charities and ambiguous CSR frameworks. Typically, they 
include financial support to an occasional cultural or sport event as well as assistance to health or 
education projects. In general, CSR seems to remain something that is sporadically added on to their 
normal operations, with little strategic importance. It is largely dealt with at the level of the 
headquarters, with hardly any awareness about CSR on the level of branch offices. Many also seem 
to think that the mandatory contribution of four per cent to deprived sectors sufficiently fulfils their 
CSR engagement or use it as an excuse for not developing their own CSR policies (interviews, bank 
officials, Kathmandu, 25 Sep to 2 Oct 2007). In view of the poor response of private banks to the 
deprived sector lending regulation, this argument does not convince. Also the Bankers’ Association 
does not encourage its members to develop CSR frameworks. Its absence from the Nepal Business 
Initiative for Peace (NBI), where it would have had a chance to engage in CSR issues, seems to 
underline this position.45 
The limited commitment to CSR and social investments sheds a bad light on the private financial 
sector, specifically because they are one of the few economic players in Nepal that came out well 
after the war. Moreover, it should be noticed that there is a tradition of social welfare in Nepal, such 
as in the concept of “Guthi”, which encourages people to contribute to society (see for example 
Save the Children 2007). There seems to be little understanding about the benefits of CSR work in 
the financial sector. In some other economic branches, such as in brick factories, the importance of 
CSR was somewhat increased as a result of the conflict. Targeted assaults by Maoists or intensified 
labour union action forced these companies, which often held a reputation of exploiting their work-
force, to improve their labour practices.46 Private financial institutions, which were less frequently 
directly targeted by unions or Maoist attacks had little incentive to change their outlook on CSR. 
Also when financial institutions rejected demands made on them to more actively engage in social 
activities and financial sector development, this remained largely without any direct repercussion. 
For the private commercial banking sector immediate benefits of CSR measures have rarely been 
tangible. The more indirect effects that the violent conflict had on them, such as the general 
economic downturn or reputational losses also did not succeed in propelling CSR-activities. But the 
World Bank Country Director writes, for instance, in a newspaper article: 
 
______________________ 
45  Reluctance of the private sector to participate in peace-supporting initiatives such as the NBI on the grounds of the 
Maoists’ business-hostile comments and policy suggestions (for example opting for a planned economy) would have been 
justifiable. However, in interviewees repeatedly claimed that the business sector did not fear a radical left turn of the 
government or the introduction of policies that opposed corporate interests in the context of the peace process. The main 
reason for this may be that the Maoists had publicly expressed more business-friendly views, since the beginning of the 
peace talks. Another reason could be the long-standing tradition of leftist parties in Nepal that made companies being 
“used to” coping with radical left-leaning demands. 
46  Labour exploitation can also be a cause for conflict - or a justification for it. In Nepal, Maoist rebels used allegations 
against companies for exploiting workers as a reason for their movement. 
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“[…] at this particular moment, when there is a huge clash of two sharply opposing ideas 
about how to manage Nepal’s economy, I would hope that the members of the banking 
community will see that they should think beyond the immediate impact on their profit and 
loss statements. Without social responsibility, a market system can break down. Today, 
thinking about how to make the banking system friendlier to the small and medium 
businesses and the poor Nepalis more generally, in my view, is what social responsibility 
demands” (Ohashi 2006). 
A good opportunity to show that the banks are interested in assisting the country in its pressing 
needs would have been in the context of the debate around restructuring loans. Although it is 
difficult to assess who was right given the politicised manner in which the debate was led - the loan-
takers claimed that the banks did not sufficiently help them in restructuring loans, or the banks who 
argued that the subject was instrumentalised and used as a pretext for willful defaulters - a more 
transparent or perhaps a more generous way of responding to the private companies’ request for 
concessions could have raised the banks’ social profile.47 
As indicated above, closely linked to the subject of CSR is the issue of conflict-sensitivity. In the 
general debate on the role of the financial sector in violent conflicts, the subject of conflict-
sensitivity was so far mostly understood in the context of international banks trying to avoid 
business relations with potentates involved in violent conflict (Know-Your-Customer-Policies etc.). 
This dimension seems to be of minor importance for the Nepal case since there is little evidence that 
Nepal developed into a conflict-economy where those concerns are of particular relevance. The 
findings from Nepal suggest, however, that there is a need for financial institutions to look at 
conflict-sensitivity on a more local level. Not only large-scale infrastructure projects, which attracted 
most attention in the past, have to be viewed through a conflict-sensitivity lens but also the every 
day smaller-scale business operations. The example of MFIs in Nepal that successfully adopted 
conflict-sensitive approaches by developing more adequate products and more actively integrating 
disenfranchised groups, illustrates the relevance of conflict-sensitivity for financial sector operations. 
Financial institutions should make an effort to explore the social, environmental and conflict impacts 
of their businesses, examining, for instance, if they directly or indirectly discriminate against certain 
caste, ethnic or gender groups. Such an approach is not only necessary to avoid sustaining or 
perpetuating a conflict but also as a coping strategy. The MFI-example shows that those institutions, 
which enjoyed legitimacy in their community, were less frequently targeted by rebel-groups and 
were, in fact, actively defended against Maoists’ assaults. Those with a bad track-record or 
reputation, in contrast, were a more frequent target. 
In general, supporting peacebuilding does not have to imply that financial institutions lose their 
profitability. It is also not intended that they become altruistic organisations, losing sight of their 
economic goals. But it can be argued that the private commercial banking sector in Nepal has 
neither fully understood not fully explored its options to better contribute to a more peaceful 
environment. Bankers interviewed for this report unanimously agreed that the violent conflict in 
Nepal was largely driven by poverty and exclusion and that the financial sector has a role to play in 
reducing poverty. But so far little concrete steps were taken to actually practice what they preach. 
The Bankers Association could play a vital role in encouraging their members to consider joint CSR-
activities or programmes, but has so far not seen its role in this field. Peacebuilding or conflict 
management seem to be perceived as subjects distant from the banks daily operations. They see it
 
______________________ 
47  Many companies and business associations requested the government to provide seed money for troubled businesses, 
such as in the form of loans. The government in fact has a programme for sick industries. But according to interview 
partners, the money has so far gone largely to big industries, primarily in the tourism sector with hardly any funds 
reaching other sectors, cottage industries or medium sized companies (interview, businessmen and representatives of 
business associations, Kathmandu, 24 Sep to 8 Oct 2007). 
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as a political matter, as events whose effects could largely be dealt with by increasing security 
measures. Little awareness exists on how banks may influence the conflict setting, in a positive or 
negative way. The banks seem, in fact, to struggle to fully comprehend what is expected from them 
with regard to social or peacebuilding engagements. More awareness about conflict issues and more 
creativity and courage would be needed before financial actors may be prepared to engage actively 
in peacebuilding. So far, hardly any concrete peacebuilding ideas have been discussed within the 
financial community. Yet, in many interviews it was suggested that if one organisation would take 
the lead, many would follow suit. 
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7 Summary findings and recommendations 
Impacts of the conflict 
1. The violent conflict in Nepal had mixed effects on the different financial sector actors in the 
country. Private commercial financial actors have only been mildly affected by the conflict; 
microfinance institutions experienced moderate effects and governmental commercial 
banks were in part severely impacted by the sustained violence. In comparison to what is 
known on the state of private commercial financial sectors in other countries coming out of 
conflict, the Nepalese sector is relatively healthy and should, for this reason, have the 
essential economic flexibility to use resources in support of national peacebuilding efforts. 
2. The variation in the consequences of the conflict for the different financial sector actors 
resulted from factors such as the geographic location of the financial institutions, the 
applied coping strategies or if the financial actor was perceived as an ideological target by 
the insurgency. The private commercial financial sector was a rare target of insurgency 
attacks and they applied successful strategies to minimise the negative economic effects of 
the conflict. 
3. While the conflict did not lead to a break down of the financial system in Nepal, it led to 
partial distress and aggravated some of the main deficiencies of the national financial 
sector. Yet, the civil war also had a “cleansing effect” on the financial sector landscape, 
creating spaces for new forms of financial sector activities and reforms. 
Peacebuilding-assistance 
4. The private financial banks in Nepal may be able to play an important role in 
peacebuilding, among others because they were not as severely affected by the conflict as 
other economic actors. In addition, most local commercial financial actors seem to be 
managed professionally, with relatively little entanglement in the pervasive cronyism of the 
country. This may make commercial financial actors more receptive for changes in the 
socio-economic status quo of the country. 
5. The comparatively weak economic impacts of the conflict on private commercial financial 
actors may, however, undermine their willingness to support peacebuilding, given a lack of 
economic incentives. Peacebuilding is, in fact, a distant subject to the private financial 
sector. They have little understanding of what their role may be in peacebuilding and 
reveal overall little propensity to support ongoing private sector activities in this field. 
Recommendation: External encouragement and awareness-raising is required for the 
financial sector to see its interlinkages with conflict and peacebuilding and to increase their 
understanding of the economic long- and short-term benefits of peace for their own 
operations. 
6. A greater sense of social investment and corporate social responsibility (CSR) is important 
as a basis for financial sector actors to engage in peacebuilding. While economic win-win 
situations are of pivotal significance, an increased sense of social responsibility may be an 
important additional impetus to motivate companies to support peacebuilding. 
Recommendation: The National Business Initiative for Peace (NBI) was in the vanguard to 
engage private sector actors in peacebuilding in Nepal, putting particular emphasis on the 
importance of corporate social responsibility. External national and international actors 
should strengthen the NBI and support its capacity to increase the awareness of the private 
business sector, including the financial sector, with regard to their social responsibility and 
their role in peacebuilding. 
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7. Activities how financial actors, primarily private commercial financial actors could 
contribute to peacebuilding include: 
• Contribute to addressing the root causes of the conflict, such as by expanding the 
financial service infrastructure in the country, offer specifically developed services and 
products, geared towards the disenfranchised parts of the population and the 
predominant reconstruction needs. 
•  Harness the increasing inflow of remittances by offering formal services so that 
remittances can be effectively used, also for the reconstruction of the country. Formal 
financial institutions have to think about creative ways of how to build on the existing 
informal remittance transfer system, learning from the experiences made in other 
conflict-affected countries where the remittance business was the “basis for rebuilding a 
new financial system on cessation of active conflict” (Maimbo 2007: 26). 
•  Develop transparent policies for restructuring loans in order to efficiently assist conflict-
affected companies to reconstruct their businesses. 
 
Recommendation: The government and international community should support the 
commercial financial sector in developing and offering new products and services, which 
have a direct or indirect contribution to peacebuilding. The incipient trend of commercial 
financial actors to expand their business operations to more remote areas of the country 
should be actively supported, for instance by providing further incentives as well as 
technical assistance. 
8. Develop conflict-sensitivity guidelines for all financial institutions and particularly for those 
active or moving into rural and remote areas, such as microfinance institutions or private 
commercial banks which consider to invest in these regions. 
Recommendation: International donors and the government should assist in developing 
conflict-sensitivity guidelines for the financial sector. It was, for instance, shown that some 
microfinance institutions, which have discriminated against certain disenfranchised 
population groups, have begun to approach this problem. Conflict sensitivity is also crucial 
against the backdrop of the need to create tangible peace-dividends for the war-affected 
population, and for those population groups which formed the main mobilisation basis of 
the insurgency - the poor, excluded and disenfranchised parts of the Nepalese population. 
It was also shown that those financial institutions which were well managed were less 
frequently targeted by the insurgency and more often protected by the clients. 
9. Microfinance institutions will continue to play a pivotal role in Nepal’s peacebuilding and 
reconstruction process. The commercial financial sector will not be able to take up the 
market that is typically served by MFIs, such as in very remote areas. The “cleansing 
effect” that the conflict had for microfinance institutions may bring a new dynamic into the 
development process of this sector. 
Recommendation: Continue to support MFIs given their relevance for post-conflict 
reconstruction. 
10. The ongoing financial sector reform has to continue to assure a long-term viability of the 
financial sector. Specifically, activities against defaulters are relevant in order to create 
trust between the population and the sector. 
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